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vs.
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Appeal from the District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah.
HON. BRYAN P. LEVERICH, Judge.

0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Atto'rneys for Defendwnt and Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
SUBJECT HEADINGS
Page
STATEMENT
1
FAILURE TO MAKE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF
FA,CT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
THE EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
As to any general working agreement . . . . . . . . . . . 26
As to the First Hill Field Job .............. 26, 27, 30
As to the Second Hill Field Job ................ 26, 31
As to the McKee Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
As to the Poulson Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
As to the Supply Depot Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
As to the Roy, Utah Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
As to the Stearns-Rogers Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
As to the Fort Douglas Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
As to the Harrison-Dorman Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
As to the Hospital Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
As to the Railroad Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
As to the Geer Job .................... 41, 43, 44,45
CROSS EXAMINATION BY THE COURT......... 49
DISCUSSIONS AND RULINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
ORDER OF REFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
COURT PROCEEDINGS JUNE 3rd, 1942 .......... 59-75
THE REFEREE'S REPORT ..................... 76-98
(His testimony) ............................ 90-97
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ..................... 99-114
THE FINAL DECREE .......................... 114-5
THE APPENDIX
AMENDED COMPLAINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM .. 12()..131
EXHIBIT E (Report of Wallace Dansie as referee) ... 132
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW .................................... 138-150
JUDGMENT ................................... 150~1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page

ERRORS
The district court erred in proceeding to an accounting before it had upon findings of fact
within the issues established defendant's. duty
or liability to account, and without entering
any decree obligating defendant to account .. 7-18, 59-75
Citations ................................... 14-18
The court erred in failing to make written findings
of fact responsive to each and every issue in
the pleadings, affirmative and negative ........ 19-48
Citations ............... ·................... 19, 21
A party who, without being interested in property,
is by agreement to receive as compensation for
his services, and only as compensation, a certain proportion of the profits, and is neither
held out to the world as a partner nor, through
the negligence of the owner permitted to hold
himself out to the world as a partner, is not a
partner either as to the owner of third persons.
The court failed to give effect to this principle
by an appropriate finding of fact upon evidence responsive to the issues but in its remarks and rulings from the bench disregarded
the same ................................... 25-28
Citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
The court erred in its conclusions from the bench
that "these were joint ventures on all these
jobs mentioned in the complaint, that is the
railroad job, the hospital job and the Harrison-Dorman job; the hospital job up to Sept.
3rd," be1cause there were no written findings.
of fact upon evidence within the issues made or
filed by the court with conclusions of law, and!
decree to account, made, filed or entered either
before or after said conclusions from the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
bench. And the court erred in proceeding to
the appointment of a. referee in the absence of
said jurisdictional pre-requisites ......... 50-54, 55-59
Citations ................................ 14-18, 19
The court further erred in its order of reference, in
that, neither by such order of reference, nor by
any decree to account, nor otherwise, did the
court require the parties to plead in accounting
by serving and filing of any statement of account, counter statement, objections or exceptions to specific items of account by either
party upon the other, so as to produce an issue
of fact for trial, limiting and defining the scope
of the evidence upon the trial of such issue or
issues. A pleading, petition, affidavit or statement of claim or account of some kind or character is essential to confer jurisdiction upon a
court to conduct a trial of a question of fa.ct or
law ....................................... 5.5-59
Citations ................................ 56, 57-58
The court erred for the same reasons last specified
in proceeding to a trial of unknown issues, or
no issues of fact defined by any pleading of the
parties, and to hear evidence directed to no
specific issue of fact, and upon no written
pleadings, and to make findings thereon,
sounding in accounting. Thereby acting without jurisdiction ............................. 59-75
Citations .......................... 14-18, 56, 57-58
The court erred in its said proceedings in receiving
or considering any evidence or testimony because it was proceeding without jurisdiction
for the reasons already stated, and especially
in receiving in evidence and in taking judicial
notice of any of the contents of the document

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued

Page

plaintiffs' Exhibit E referred to by court and·
counsel as a "referee's report" .............. 62-67,73
The said referee report, plaintiffs' exhibit A was
void on its face, and on the face of the record
for the reasons that:
(a) The author thereof, Mr. Dansie never
qualified by taking the oath required by Utah
Const. Art. VI, Sec. 10 and Utah Annot. Code,
1943, 104-27-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

(b) The author thereof never proceeded in
conformity to Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 104-276, to give notice to the parties, conduct a trial,
hear sworn testimony, make findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and to report the results thereof to the court................... 76-78,98
(c) The author thereof proceeded, on the contrary to interview various persons ex parte,
out of the presence of defendant and his counsel, to make private inquiries, and to receive
and consider unsworn hearsay statements, oral
and written, from various unknown persons;
and: to receive and consider the contents of
sundry written books, records and documents
submitted to him by plaintiffs and by unknown
persons without the oaths of attesting witness
or witnesses, and out of the presence of defendant and his counsel; .and to compile a report
based upon unsworn hearsay statements of
persons, books or documents unknown to the
defendant .................................. 78-98
Citations .................................. 79, 98
(d) By these and other steps and proceedings
unknown to and forbidden by law the author
of the report purported to make and state an
account wherein and whereby he resolved all

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
questions and doubts in his mind against the
defendant and in favor of the plaintiffs, and
refused to consider statements of claim by
third persons which, if allowable, were just
claims in accounting in the nature of operating expenses which must first be deducted
from gross income, before striking any balance in accounting .......................... 85-89
Citations ................................... 87-88
(e) The author of said report was never lawfully appointed referee to take or state an account, because the court was without jurisdiction to make the order of appointment, in the
absence of any prior findings of fact and decree to account; and also because there were
no written pleadings or issues defining the
issues and limiting proofs in accounting to
specific items of debit or credit, charge or
counter-charge in account .................... 55-59
Citations .......................... 14-18, 19, 56, 58
The findings of fact made by the court as a result
of the attempted accounting without or in excess of jurisdiction, insofar as they attempted
to respond to the original issues of partnership
or employee relation between the parties and
duty to acount, were too late, were insufficient
and unresponsive to most of the issues in that
respect in the amended complaint and amended
answer and counter-claim, and did not confer
jurisdiction in accounting ................... 99-114
The findings of fact were unlawful because made
in response to no pleading, and no definite
issue defining and limiting proofs, and because
the same were repugnant to the proofs accepted and heard by the court without any issues in accounting ......................... 100-114

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued

Page

The findings of fact were unlawful and void because it rested almost entirely upon the void
report of Mr. Dansie acting as referee and
containing only the results of unsworn hearsay
statements of various persons received out of
the presence of defendant. Without said hear·say report there was no evidence to support the
findings as to profits earned, items deductible,
or balance proposed to be divided ............. 99-114
The trial court erred in refusing to consider evidence before it and in rejecting other like evidence, showing that defendant was injuriously
debited in accounting with ten cents per cubic
yard on 72,676.05 cubic yards of material
hauled by Newman on the hospital job, and
plaintiffs credited therewith, for which Newman paid and performed the sole consideration
in the haulage thereof ...................... 110•112
1he trial court in its. findings and rulings. with respect to an asserted change order made in defendant Newman's contract with the government on the hospital job and in crediting plain-.
tiffs with two-thirds of the benefit thereof in
which they had no interest .................. 110-112
The trial court erred in making conditional findings, and in requiring the giving or filing by
defendant, or by either party, of an indemnity
bond as a condition to relief from, or abatement
of, any portion thereof ..................... 112-114
The final judgment was void for each of the reasons
hereinbefore specified with respect to the issues, evidence and findings, and because unsupported by issues or evidence. Also because
of its requirement that a bond or bonds be filed
as a condition to relief from a portion thereof .. 114-115

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
CITATIONS
Page
Anderson's Estate, In re, 198 Pac. 236 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Beard v. Rowland et al., 81 Pac. 188 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Beckwith v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 207 F'ed. 848... 56
1 Corp. Jur., 642, Accounting, sec. 129 .......... 14, 17, 18
1 Corp. Jur., 643, Accounting, sec. 130 ............. 14, 16
1 Corp. Jur., 647, Accounting, sec. 140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1 Corp. Jur., Seg. 680, Accounting, sec. 40 . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 Corp. Jur., Seg. 684 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
47 Corp. Jur., 667-674, sees. 61-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
47 Corp. Jur., 780, Partnership, sec. 221 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
47 Corp. Jur., 781, Partnership, sec. 221 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
47 Corp. Jur., 911, Partnership, sec. 401 ... ~·........ 88
47 Corp. Jur., 1241, Partnership, sec. 955 ........ 14, 17, 21
47 Corp. Jur., 1245, Partnership, sec. 955 . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
53 Corp. Jur., 720, References, sec. 110 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
53 Corp. Jur., 735, References, sec. 135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, etc. Co., 14 Utah 339, 47
Pac. 311 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Eureka Mining Co. v. Bullion Beck, etc. Min. Co.,
32 Utah 236, 90 Pac. 157 ..................... 79, 98
Evans, In re, 42 Utah 292, 130 Pac. 217 .......... 19, 58, 63
Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 Pac. 2d 703 . . . . . . . . . 16
Fed. Eq. Rules, rule 79 (new rule 63, 198 Fed. vii).... 56
Hanks v. Matthews, 8 Utah 181, 30 Pac. 504 ......... 30, 98
Hanson, In re, 48 Utah 163, 158 Pac. 778 ........... 30, 98
Healey v. Wellesley, etc. Ry. Co., 176 Mass. 440, 47
N. E. 703 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Hillyard v. Dist. Court, 68 Utah 220, 249 Pac. 806..... 57
Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 558, 37 Pac. 2d 777 . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Lefevre v. Castiagnino, 5 Colo. 564 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Mason v. Hackett, 4 Nev. 420 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued

Page

Michener v. Fransham, 81 Pac. 953 ................ · 28
Milton v. Richardson, 47 N. Y. Supp. 735 .......... · · 56
Moore v. Reinhart, 117 N.Y. Supp. 534 ............ · · 56
Myers v. Bennett, 3 Lea (71 Tenn.) 184.............. 56
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 14, 235 Pac. 580 ......... 5, 57
Parchen v. Anderson, 5 Pac. 588.................... 28
Reever v. White, 8 Utah 188, 30 Pac. 685 . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Rosenthyne v. McCulloch ~co., 168 Pac. 957 . . . . . . . . . . 58
Rozelle v. District Court, 85 Utah 582, 39 Pac. 2d 1113.14, 17
Shepard v. Pratt, 16 Kan. 209, 21 Pac. Stat. Rep. 209 . . 28
Tate v. Crooke, 68 Pac. 74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Thompson v. Reynolds, 174 Pac. 164 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 104-27-6 ................. 53, 54) 77,?~1 ,
Utah Annot. Code, 104-27-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Utah Anot. Code, 1943, 104-39-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 104..54-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78) f-5 ·
Utah Annot. Code, 69-1-35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Utah Rev. Stat. 1933, 104-26-2 and 104-26-3 . . . . . . . . . . 19
Utah Rev. Stat. 1933, page 1300 column 2, decisions. . . . 19
Wade v. Hornaday, 140 Pac. 870 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Weiland v. Sell, 109 Pac. 771 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Wiggins v. Gans, 61 N.Y. Super Ct., 646 . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. J. HUBER and
RALPH DUNKLEY,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

No. 69166.

vs.
VICTOR NEWMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah.
HON. BRYAN P. LEVERICH, Judge.

S.TATEMENT
This is an action by plaintiffs above named against
defendant Newman to dissolve an alleged general partnership in the contracting business claimed to have been begun
in the forepart of April, 1942, embracing a general line
of business in the intermountain area and still subsisting;
for an accounting of pending business, and for a judgment
for any balance to be found due them on such accounting.
As interim relief they asked for the appointment of a
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receiver to take over, make collections, pay debts, wind
up and distribute. See Complaint Rec., pp. 1-3.) From an
assirted judgment for plaintiffs for $19,451.03 the defendant appeals.
At the outset, before the issuance or service of a summons, the plaintiffs caused to be issued and served a show
cause order (rec. 5) and citation (10) requiring defendant to appear and show why a receiver should not be appointed. The order contained an injunction against Newman
paying out any of his funds or disposing of his property
or assets. The injunction order was, however, vacated because improvidently issued without notice, hearing or bond
(9). And at the hearing receivership was denied (18), the
alleged partnership having been denied under oath (17)
and the plaintiff failing to make a case therefor by his
oral testimony. It was further shown that the only current
business of Mr. Newman was under large construction contracts made by him with the Government, its prime contractors, or the Western Pacific Railroad Company for
construction work urgently needed in connection with the
war defense effort. These contracts were awarded to Newman alone (not with Huber or Dunkley) upon a careful
scrutiny of his ability to perform, secured by heavy indemnity bonds furnished by himself, and were not transferrable. A court receiver without financial backing or
experience in construction work could not get himself
substituted in Newman's place in these contracts, nor
compel the Government or others to recognize or do business with him. The contracts contained clauses authorizing
cancellation and reletting in the event of any delays or
complications threatening interference or punctual com-
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pletion of the jobs. Any attempted interference by a court
receiver would simply have destroyed instead of preserving
the res for final adjudication by the court.
The hearing on the receivership application was on
October 28, 1942 (rec. 10, 12) and was denied November 5, 1942 (minute order p. 18). Some days later another
and more lengthy order was prepared by plaintiffs' counsel
(why so, rather than by counsel of the prevailing party?),
which was signed by the Judge and served on defendant's
counsel (rec. pp. 21-22). In this order, not only was the
denial of a receiver repeated, but there was also inserted
a clause (may we presume inadvertently?) awarding to
plaintiff certain affirmative relief not prayed for in the
show cause order or citation and on which defendant had
not been heard or cited into court. That is to say, the defendant Newman was ordered and required to immediately
keep separate accounts of the work done on the pending
hospital job, railroad job, and Harrison-Dorman job mentioned in the complaint; that he keep his funds pertaining
to those jobs separate and apart from his other funds; that
he do not commingle, dissipate or disburse the same except
for necessary expenses on those jobs, pending final determination of the case; and that separate accounts be
ready for inspection by plaintiffs within ten days after
service of the order upon him (21, 22 and 23, 24).
These affirmative provisions of the order denying a
receiver were void because without or in excess of jurisdiction. First, because it was not within the scope or purview
of the show cause order and citation by which defendant
was brought before the court. Second, it purported to grant
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affirmative mandatory relief by way of accounting at that
preliminary and interlocutory stage of the case, by way of
an order to account, which could only be lawfully granted
after issues joined, trial, findings and decree to account
in plaintiffs' favor. By his affidavit on the hearing of
the show cause order the defendant categorically denied
that any partnership existed between him and the plaintiffs, and the burden was upon them to established that
contested fact at a trial on the merits. And third, the defendant was not served with a summons requiring him to
answer the complaint until November 4, 1942 (pp. 19-20)
which was a week after the hearing on the receivership application, and but one day before the court's minute order
denying the same.
The said supplementary order was further void because
it was in the nature of a writ of mandamus, or a mandatory injunction, commanding the defendant to do something which could not in any event be granted or awarded
without notice, hearing, and an injunction bond to indemnify defendant against loss or damage if it finally be
determined that the order or relief was wrongfully granted,
contrary to the governing statute. Injunctive relief is
nearly always confined to preventative relief, i. e. to stay
threatened action. Affirmative or mandatory relief is very
rare indeed, and only in clear cases and with abundant
caution. It is never granted to anticipate relief which can
only be given by the final decree.
Defendant's counsel at once moved to vacate and set
aside this order (p. 26), but presently decided that the
order, being innocuous and void on its face, could not
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acquire force and effect by delay to bring the motion to
vacate it to a hearing. In the apt words of Judge Straup
in Oldroyd v. McCrea,, Judge, "its nullity would keep and
would not be mellowed by age." Meantime it could be
resisted and thrown aside whenever any attempt should
be made to enforce it. We mention the matter at this time
because plaintiffs' counsel spent a good deal of time at the
trial in trying to convince defendant on the witness stand
that he was guilty of contemptuous conduct in not obeying
the order, and in trying to frighten him by swinging the
order like a club over his head. And the trial judge (other
than the one who made the order) appeared to fall in with
the notion to a substantial extent.
Thereafter the plaintiffs elected to file an amended
complaint (13-16), which was in large part a reiteration
of the original complaint. And the defendant filed an
original, and later an amended, answer and counterclaim
(pp. 51-59). The latter denied the allegations of partnership relation or status, but admitted certain transactions
with plaintiffs pertaining to the three jobs mentioned. And
in his third defense and counter-claim defendant alleged that
he himself was the sole owner and contractor on the three
jobs in question; and that the plaintiffs were employed by
him for a compensation or reward to perform supervisory
and accounting service for defendant on the jobs in question
during the latter's necessitated absence in charge of his
operations on other construction work on larger and more
important jobs or contracts. And that these were the matters sought to be complained of in the complaint.
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In the counter-claims it was further alleged that the
plaintiffs while so employed in the defendant's service, had
received about $13,000 of defendant's money, for which they
had never accounted to defendant; but which they had disbursed largely for their own use and benefit, and in other
and unexplained disbursements ; that they had failed to
keep proper books of account; that they had failed to keep
their transactions and accounts upon the three jobs in
question separate and apart from each other, but had so
commingled the same as to render impossible the separation of items and disbursements belonging to each of the
three jobs from the others, for which defendant in turn
would be accountable to separate and independent imployers; and so that it was likewise impossible to determine
the true state of accounts as between the defendant and
the plaintiffs as his employees, servants or agents. That
the plaintiffs had received and appropriated to their own
uses, and failed to account to the defendant, fN{ more than
sufficient of defendant's funds entrusted to them, to pay
and satisfy all just claims they might have had against
the defendant. That they had also mismanaged and botched
up the jobs under their supervision, and betrayed his confidence and trust. That they were debarred, in equity, from
calling upon defendant for an accounting until they should
first account to him as aforesaid, so that the results thereof
might be taken into consideration in any final settlement
between defendant and the plaintiffs. He prayed that the
court require plaintiffs to give an account of their stewardship of his funds, property and affairs committed to their
trust. For copy of these pleadings see Appendix post
p. 116.
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Thus it appears by the pleadings that both the plaintiffs and the defendant are suing each other for an equitable
accounting, the grounds of equity jurisdiction being, on
the one hand, the existence of a general partnership between
the parties and conduct by one partner detrimental to the
other two ; and on the other hand a denial of the partnership and an allegation instead of an employment relation
involving trust and confidence, the receipt of large sums
of the employer's money by his employees; their misappropriation of large sums thereof; their failure and neglect
to keep adequate accounts to show what they did with the
money; and to keep separate accounts upon the different
jobs on which they were employed and upon which defendant had contracted with separate institutions or concerns
and must account to each separately. And on the ground of
multiplicity and complexity of the items of account involved.
It follows that it was the first duty of the trial court
to determine from evidence which of these conflicting
theories is correct. If plaintiffs' theory of a general partnership with defendant embracing not only the three unsettled jobs in question but numerous others was correct,
and that the defendant was guilty of conduct prejudicing
the rights and interests of the plaintiffs, it should make
findings of fact and conclusions of law accordingly, and
enter a preliminary judgment that defendant account to
the plaintiffs. That is, that defendant should file in court
and serve on the plaintiffs a written statement of account,
containing both receipts and disbursements, with leave
to plaintiffs to surcharge and falsify the same in any one
or more items and particulars. But if the court should find
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upon the evidence that there was no partnership relation,
or none involving the three jobs complained about, or any
of them, then it should enter a decree that plaintiffs take
nothing, that defendant is not liable to account, and dismiss
the complaint.
On the other hand, should the evidence justify a finding that the plaintiffs were employees of the defendant,
entrusted with his money, confidence, and management or
supervision of one or more of his construction jobs that
defendant had under independent contracts of his own with
the Government, the railroad or other large institutions;
that they owed him duties of loyalty and obedience to lawful
instructions ; also a degree of care, skill and ability commensurate with the tasks undertaken by them for him; the
duty of strict and accurate accounting of money, property
and affairs of defendant as their employer; the keeping
of just, correct and adequate books of account upon each
separate job on which they were employed, especially of
the disbursements, distinct from the outlays upon other
jobs; and the duty to show and prove every disbursement
claimed to have been made by them from the trust funds
in their hands. Upon such a showing by the evidence, it
would be the court's duty not only to deny the accounting
asked by the plaintiffs and dismiss their complaint, but to
make findings and decree pursuant to the counter-claims
that the plaintiffs account to the defendant by serving and
filing an itemized statement of their receipts and disbursements upon each job separately, and to make a full accounting to defendant ·of all trust funds in their hands. Such
a statement the defendant might contradict, surcharge and
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falsify by objections and exceptions, to be supported by evidence. Should the plaintiffs have been unable to do this
by reason of their own recreancy in keeping the accounts,
or by reason of their misappropriation and misuse of the
funds, it would have been just too bad for them, and for
their chances of getting out of the affair without a heavy
judgment against themselves in defendant's favor, instead
of recovering anything from him. Citations later.
Suppose a further possible case, for which there is
warrant in the evidence. Should the court upon a survey
of all the evidence, find and conclude that the plaintiffs
were trusted employees of the defendant; that they had
mismanaged and misappropriated his funds, and botched
the jobs to his great financial loss, and failed to keep adequate accounts so that his business in their hands was
thrown into dire confusion, preventing any possible itemized accounting. But that the agreed compensation to which
they would have been entitled for a proper and meritorious
performance of the duties of their employment was to have
been a share of the net profits after all bills were paid. In
such a situation they would certainly not have been entitled
to an accounting from defendant of the net profits until
they had first rendered to him a just and correct accounting,
not only of all moneys entrusted to them and the outlays
upon each job separately, but all losses suffered by defendant in consequence of their wilful or negligent acts
or misconduct in the handling of the work trusted to their
supervision, for which they were equally accountable as
for the trust moneys. If they should fail or be unable to so
account in full, and to prove the correctness and legality of
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every disbursement of the trust moneys, they would thereby
debar and prevent themselves from seeking an accounting
from defendant of the net profits; since their own correct
accounting would enter into and become part of a correct
accounting by defendant in fixing the net profits. In such
case their prayer for equitable relief would kick back in
their own faces and they would become subject to both civil
and criminal remedies. Citations later.
In stating these principles of the law of equitable accounting we are not immediately concerned with the mechanics of such an accounting, if and when decreed in favor
of one party or the other. That is, we are not now concerned with whether the court itself may take the accounts,
or whether it should be referred to a referee. In a proper
case the court may do either, in its discretion. But we
are saying that before the court could lawfully proceed
to an accounting in one way or the other, it must first,
upon evidence within the issues, make appropriate findings
of fact constituting the ground-work upon which it, by
its decree, shall fix the liability of one party or the other
to proceed to make such an accounting. This is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any accounting at all, as this court
has decided, and until complied with there is no power,
authority or jurisdiction of the court to meddle with the
matter, or to proceed to an accounting at its own instance
regardless of the unsettled issues in the pleadings. The
trial court erred in this vital matter as we shall see.
This neglect of the court was not due to any lack of
understanding or due appreciation of the proper order of
procedure. This was made clear not only by the opening

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
statements of counsel, but from the subsequent discussions
in the progress of the trial. Thus, during the crossexamination of plaintiff Dunkley on the witness stand,
when he had testitfied regarding the Harrison-Dorman
job (one of those involved in the action), that he stayed
on that job about three weeks, then left it and did not go
back; that he had heard how much money had been paid
or received on the job, but he had never made any settlement with Mr. Newman. Then Dunkley's attorney flew to
his rescue with an offer to account immediately if Newman
would do likewise (oblivious to the considerations we have
mentioned, and without tendering any written or itemized
statement of account by Dunkley or Huber-hence a mere
stall or smoke screen). To which Newman attorney replied:
"We will settle on the basis of our profit out
there right now, because we lost $6000.00."
MR. MATTHEWS: It is a different theory
entirely. We are asking for an accounting on the
basis of the relation of trust and confidence in our
employees. They are asking for an accounting on
the basis of a partnership before partnership has
been proven, which cannot be done.
THE COURT: Then you refuse the offer?
MR. MORRISSEY: The offer that he made,
yes; unless the court thinks there is a partnership.
THE COURT: I am not ready to hold that yet.
* * * You are asking for an accounting in your
counter-claim, but upon a different theory.
MR. MORRISSEY: That is it, as I understand
the pleadings.
THE COURT: I take it that if both of you ask
for an accounting, then probably there should be
an accounting. The only question is what theory the
accounting should be on.
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MR. MORRISSEY: I think so.
THE COURT: All right, let us go into that. Let
us go into the question of whether this is a partnership. Leave the rest of it out until we get through
with that. (Rec. pp. 186, 187, 188.)
And a little while later, after a discussion of the same
proposition, the court stated:
'THE COURT: If there is a partnership I will
order the account to cover all of this matter set up
here. But if the ·court determines it is not a partnership I will dismiss the complaint, no cause of
action. I will do the same on the counterclaim.
MR. MORRISSEY: I think so, yes. (Rec. pp.
201-202.)
And again later, the defendant Newman was asked
on cross-examination:
Q. You haven't paid Mr. Dunkley or Mr. Huber
any moneys on the Harrison-Dorman job, have you?
A. The Harrison-Dorman job definitely lost
$7,000.
Q. You haven't given them an accounting on
that?
MR. MATTHEWS: I object to that. There is
no order of this court for an accounting, and until
it is decided that there is. a partnership and an order
made, none can be had. ( Rec. pp. 227, 228.)
Again, at another point, when Mr. Dunkley was asked
on the stand about certain checks drawn by him and Huber
on the Huber & Dunkley bank account in which it was elsewhere testified that about $13,000 of Victor Newman's
money had been deposited. He was asked:
Q. Here is one (check) for $3,000, or $5,000?
Tell us what became of that, if you know?
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MR. CALLISTER: Just a moment; it looks to
me like we are getting into the accounting phase of it.
THE COURT: Yes, I think we are getting into
that. Let us see if there should be an accounting
first.
MR. MORRISSEY: All right. (Rec. p. 186.)
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of two days' trial of
this case, the trial court, without having determined any
of the issues in the pleading as to which of the parties
owed a duty to account to the other, without deciding
whether the plaintiffs were partners of defendant or employees of the defendant; without deciding which of the
parties had breached their duties as a partner or as an
employee, proceeded to the appointment of a referee with
instructions to take an account. (Rec. pp. 77, 78-79 and
Bill of Excep. pp. 303-308.)
When we say the trial court failed to decide these
issues, we of course mean that the court made no written
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or decree ordering
either plaintiffs or the defendant to account to the other,
establishing their status or relationship to each other, the
breach of duty flowing therefrom, or settling the issues in
the pleadings in this respect. Until this has been done the
trial court acquires no jurisdiction to order an accounting.
Apparently the trial court intended to have findings prepared and a decree to account. For, after indicating his
oral conclusion at the end of the second day's trial that it
seemed to him "that these were joint ventures up to Septemper 3, 1942 (Rec. pp. 303, 305) ; and that a referee
should be appointed (Rec. p. 306), he went on to say to
plaintiffs' counsel : "I will want you to prepare findings
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in the nature of an interlocutory decree" (Rec. 308), meaning doubtless that both findings and a decree should be
prepared. But it was never done.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
TO PROCEED TO AN ACCOUNTING OF THE AFFAIRS
OF AN ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP UNTIL IT HAS
FIRST JUDICIALLY DETERMINED T'HE EXISTENCE
OF SUCH PARNERSHIP UPON ADEQUATE EVIDENCE
WITHIN THE ISSUES, AND UNTIL AFTER IT HAS
ENTERED AN APPEALABLE DECREE THAT DEFENDANT ACCOUNT.

Rozelle v. District Court, 85· Utah 582; 39 Pac.
2d 1113;
1 Corp. Jur. Segundum, 680, Accounting, sec. 40;
1 Corp. Jur., Accounting, p. 642, sec. 129, n. 8-9,
12-15;
1 Corp. J ur., Accounting, p. 643, sec. 130, n. 31;
47 Corp. Jur., Partnership, p. 1241, sec. 955, n.
90-93.
The facts pleaded and relief asked in the Rozelle case
were a close parallel to the complaint in the instant case.
The district court on the trial of the Rozelle case made
written findings of fact responsive to the issues, to the
effect that a partnership existed, with conclusions of law
and a decree to account following. To that extent the trial
court followed correct procedure. But there was no evidence at the trial that a three-way partnership existed, as
alleged in the complaint. Hence the judgment to account
could not be upheld. On appeal to the Supreme Court
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(coupled with the writ of certiorari issued by this court
to bring up the record and stay the hand of the district
court from proceeding with the accounting) this court
held:
1. That the district court had no jurisdiction
to order an accounting of a partnership that did not
exist;
2. That the judgment of the District Court
finding and decreeing a partnership, without evidence thereof, though void was an appealable judgment, and voidable on certiorari ;
3. That the void judgment could be reviewed
and vacated on appeal and certiorari without awaiting the result of the accounting ordered by the trial
court. That is, the defendant could protect himself
from the accounting illegally ordered by coming
to the Supreme Court with it.
That is, where a complaint alleges partnership and
breach of duty, there is apparent jurisdiction. If the proofs
fail to show partnership and liability to account, the apparent jurisdiction fails and the court cannot proceed to
an account.
But these two necessities compel a third one, as the
Rozelle case and other citations show, namely, that the trial
court must make written findings of the facts constituting
partnership and breach of duty creating liability to account;
it must draw the appropriate conclusions of law therefrom;
and it must deceree the party liable to proceed to render
such account. Neither the allegation nor the proof, nor
both together, create an enforcible duty or obligation to
account; but there must be allegation, proofs, findings, conclusions and decree to account to effect that result. And
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the losing party has the right to test the correctness of
the findings and decree by an appeal to the Supreme Court
before he can be obliged to account or to open his books
to the inspection of the opposite party. Otherwise the
damage would be done before he could prevent it. The
right of privacy of one's books and papers is a valuable
right and is surrounded by constitutional safeguards. See
Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 Pac. 2nd 703.
And although the injured party may invoke certiorari
or prohibition in a proper case, he may if he choose, wait
and correct both jurisdictional and procedural errors by
appeal from any final judgment entered after an attempted
accounting.
The principles of the decision of this court in the Rozelle
case have been reflected in the decisions of the courts of
other states, and in the following law texts supported by
the decisions cited in the notes thereto.
As defendant is not obliged to account until
plaintiff's right thereto is determined after disposing of all matters in bar, the practice is to enter a
preliminary decree directing the defendant to acccount.
1 Corpus Juris, p. 643, Accounting, sec. 130,
n. 30-31.
The neglect of the trial court to comply with this jurisdictional requirement necessitates a reversal of its judgment
against the defendant, and this appeal might well end here.
There are however numerous other vital errors, most
of which we feel called upon to lay before the court in this
brief. Not that we wish to burden the court with unnecessary work. But we are mindful of the fact that the court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
is at liberty, in its discretion, to suspend its labors whenever it is satisfied that the judgment complained of must
be reversed. Counsel for an appellant, however, feel it to
be their duty to pretty well cover the field, so that the
client's interests may in any event receive protection.
Where an accounting is sought, an interlocutory
judgment, decree or order establishing the rights of
the parties, dissolving the partnership where it has
not already been dissolved, determining the defendant's liability to account, and directing an accounting, is usually a prerequisite to the actual taking and
stating of an account.
47 Corpus Juris, p. 1241, Partnership, sec. 955,
notes 90-93 and cases cited.
And while in some states this decree is treated only
as interlocutory, in others, including Utah, it is final for
the purposes of an appeal.
Rozelle v. District Court, supra.
1 Corpus Juris, 647, Accounting, sec. 140, note
89 and cases.
The correct practice in suits for an accounting is
first to dispose of all matters, in bar of the accounting before entering a decree to account. And even
when the plea in bar does not cover all the matters
involved in the pleadings, it should be first passed
upon.
1 Corpus Juris, p. 642, Accounting, sec. 129,
notes 8-9 and cases.
Of course, in a case where the defendant does not dispute the partnership relation, or his duty to account, but
only contends that upon a proper accounting the balance
is in his own favor, there is no preliminary issue to be
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settled, and he should tender his account with his answer.
Thus:
Where the right to an account is admitted in
terms or in effect, the court may order it at once
without waiJ<ting to try the issues of fact raised by
the pleadings.
Id., p. 642, note 10 and citations.
We are not concerned with that situation here, because
the answer and counter-claims flatly denied the partnership
relation and duty of defendant to account at the outset,
and the defendant stood on his rights to have that issue
decided first and before any accounting should be undertaken.
Complainant is not entitled to a decree to account, as of course, and if the answer called for is
given and there is no admission of the allegations of
the bill, and no consent to the entry of the decree,
the decree should not be directed except after a hearing upon which complainant must adduce evidence
of the existence of the facts alleged as the basis of
· his right to an accounting; otherwise, the bill will
be dismissed.
1 Corpus Juris, pp. 642-3, sec. 129, notes 12-15
et cit.
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FAILURE TO MAKE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT
An appealable decree to account presupposes written
findings of fact and conclusions of law separately, supporting such decree, as required by code section 104-26-2.
And these findings must be responsive to each and every
issue in the pleadings on which the right to an accounting
depends. No such findings were ever made or filed in this
case, and no decree to account was ever entered.
It will not suffice for plaintiffs to refer to the findings and decree entered by the court two months later, on
June 7, 1942 (Rec. pp. 83-90), based upon the void attempted accounting in the interim, on which a large money
judgment was entered by the court in attempted consumation of such void accounting. Those findings are void for
lack of jurisdiction to enter upon an accounting, and so
is the decree which follows it.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO
MAKE AND FILE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT
RESPONSIVE TO EACH AND EVERY ISSUE IN THE
PLEADINGS, BOTH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE.
A FAILURE TO MAKE A FINDING UPON EACH AND
EVERY MATERIAL ISSUE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
See Utah Rev. Stat. 1933, 104-26-2 and 104-26-3,
and decisions of Supreme Court thereunder,
cited in great number in column 2, page
1300, following said sections.
It would be superfluous to recite those decisions here,

in view that the proposition is rudimentary in the mind of
every justice of this court and of most lawyers.
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Taking up the amended complaint (Rec. pp. 13-15)
there is no finding responsive to:
Paragraphs 1 and 2, alleging a partnership;
Paragraphs 3 and 4, alleging breaches of duty;
and the amended answer and counter-claim (Rec. pp. 51-56)
there is no finding responsive to :
The negative issues contained in the first defense (Rec. 51);
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, (Rec. 53, 54) of the third
defense and counter-claim;
None as to the alleged breaches, of duty, in
parag. 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof;
None as to the averments in parag. 9, 10, 11
thereof;
None as to the issues concerning the Fort Douglas job alleged in the fourth defense and
counter-claim (Rec. 56-59) .
Neither are there any conclusions of law that would
be responsive to such findings of fact, if made. Especially
required was a finding of fact responsive to the issue tendered in paragraph 5 of the third defense and counter-claim
(Rec. p. 54) alleging that the plaintiffs had received in
trust more than $13,000 of defendant's money for which
they had failed to account, and appropriated to their own
use.
It is alleged in the third defense and counter-claim
that because of these and other derelictions and failure to
keep records and render accounts, they had not only confused and jumbled matters between plaintiffs and defendant themselves, but had also mixed up defendants transactions on the different jobs so that defendant could not account to his own employers and correlates on each job
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separately. As in other walks of life where a party has
by his own acts prevented the relief he seeks and bungled
the accounts of his employer or partner he will be denied
such relief.
47 Corp. Jur. 1241, Partnership, sec. 955, n. 5
and 6;
Id. 1245, Partnership, notes 71-72, 74-75.
Hence the necessity for a specific finding of fact on this
issue.

THE EVIDENCE

In view that neither issues nor evidence create a duty
to account until consummated by appropriate findings and
decree to account, it may be unnecessary to devote much
time or space to pointing out the evidence in this voluminous record upon which such findings and decree could and
should have been rested. It is sufficient if there was some
evidence, pro or con, on which the issues of fact could have
been settled by appropriate findings and decree. Furthermore, should we undertake to sift out all the evidence, distribute the same under each of the issues, and point out
the appropriate findings for each, it would not only neces-
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sitate enormous labor, but might imply a belief that this
court is going to take upon itself the burden of preparing
or adopting findings, de novo, to supply the omission of
the trial court to do so. We entertain no such belief.
Nevertheless we may, without trespassing too greatly
on the necessities of the case, devote a few pages to assembling some of the evidence upon the first and most outstanding issue in the case, i. e., that as to the existence, or no,
of the alleged partnership relation between the parties on
which plaintiffs' case hinges. We do this, not to invite this
court to make a finding thereon, but to show that there was
evidence calling for a finding which the trial court omitted
to make on a jurisdictional matter, before it should proceed
to an attempted accounting. This issue, of course, envisages
not only what was said and done by the parties, but the
logical inferences arising from a comparison of the financial
strength, standing and ability of the plaintiffs to balance
against the defendant's capital, assets, and established business standing in the construction field. What mutuality
of contribution could there be between such disproportionate odds? In the testimony upon these elements of the
situation, we let each party testify for himself rather than
submit him to the possibly biased opinion of others. The
plaintiff Huber did not appear or testify at the trial at all.
But the plaintiff Dunkley threw some light on the standing
and assets of both plaintiffs. Concerning himself, Mr.
Dunkley testified :
"Prior to this I had done a little trucking, if it
might be termed that. I don't claim to be a contractor
comparable to a big contractor. By 'contractor,' if I
agree to move something at a certain price, in that
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way I might term myself a contractor. Prior to the
*Hill Field Job I had operated trucks. about a year,
and before that I used to haul produce and any other
thing that might come along. About a year previous
I had hauled some gravel." (Rec. 138, 139.,
*NOTE: The "Hill Field Job" was the first of several small
jobs which the parties undertook together.

It was further testified by both Dunkley and Newman
that neither Huber nor Dunkley ever owned more than one
truck each on any of the jobs in evidence in this case, for
the use or rental of which they received liberal compensation in addition to such compensation as they bargained
for, for their personal time and service. (Rec. pp. 158, 1601, 163-6, 169, 171, 179, 191, 195.)
On the other hand, Newman alone was possessed of
equipment of the value of more than $100,000 including,
inter alia, three shovels, three cats, 25 trucks, one road
patrol, and a variety of other tools and equipment, which
"keeps getting bigger all the time." (Rec. pp. 202-203, 235.)
On these facts there was no dispute or conflict in the evidence.
By "shovels" reference is made to the large caterpillar
tractors mounting an engine and an immense crane or steel
arm, turning on a pivot as it swings about, on which by
wire ropes and pulleys a huge spiked bucket or scoop bites
into a solid bank of earth and gravel, lifting two or three
tons at a bite, which it dumps into waiting trucks to be
hauled away. These shovels are said to cost when new about
$25,000 each, ·but there is mention in the evidence of a
smaller second-hand one for $14,000.
There is evidence also that Newman's services and
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equipment are in large and steady command by the government, and by large prime contractors who wish to subcontract for grading and removal of dirt, gravel and rock.
His recognized ability to get things done, his financial
standing and equipment, etc., have gotten him a standing
and a reputation for capacity and dependability. The consequence is that he is overloaded with large construction
jobs in his line, for which the contract prices run well into
the five figures. He works his clerks and bookkeepers to
death trying to keep up. Neither he nor the plaintiffs are
very well educated. But Newman is a "live wire," a captain
of industry in the industrial army on which so much now
depends. He is a General, while the plaintiffs are privates,
or at most sergeants or corporals. Like Cincinnatus of old,
or our own General Israel Putnam, who were called from
their plows to command an army in their country's service;
like the peasant Garibaldi, he is indispensible in the present
crisis. He is qualified to both give orders and to see that
they are executed. His employees like him, like to work
for him. His coming upon a job galvanizes them into steady
action and they move; so does the sand and gravel. He gets
action.
The plaintiffs, per contra, by this record, never had a
job of their own which they were able to execute and perform on their own resources. And of those on which they
were employed by Newman, they succeeded in taking two
small ones in their own names, but they depended on Newman's aid and assistance, his equipment, his funds to meet
the pay rolls. (The McKee Job, 121-2, 157-9, 209, 210.)
(The Supply Depot Job, 164-166·.) One of those two was
Newman's by arrangement in the first instance, but they
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being on the ground took it in their own names, and Newman financed and equipped it. The other jobs were all
Newman's, gotten in his name, on his responsibility, depending on his equipment, funds, standing and credit, on
which plaintiffs had employment on liberal terms of compensation, as a friendly gesture. As Newman testified: "I
always thought I was doing Huber a favor." (Rec. pp. 209210; post p. 32.)
Going now beyond this preliminary comparison of
the financial standing, assets and capability of these parties,
we proceed to their actual words and dealings from which
any partnership or other relationship must be constructed.
At the outset we find the plaintiffs in dependant's home,
enjoying his hospitality, willing recipients of the financial
crumbs falling from his table. While so present as his
friends and guests, Newman's home telephone rang and
he was called to speak with Captain Beener of the U. S.
Army Engineering Corps at Hill Field, near Ogden. Captain Beener asked Newman to come up in a hurry the next
day with a dozen trucks to do some grading in a hurry.
Newman replied that he was too busy with other work
already undertaken but he said, I have a couple of fellows
here and I will send them up with some equipment to supervise the job. Huber and Dunkely consented to go up and
supervise it and keep the books and accounts on the job.
Within fifteen minutes Newman by telephone rounded up
seven of the ten trucks sent up and Huber and Dunkley
found the other three or took their own two. (Newman,
Rec. pp. 203 to 207; Dunkley, Rec. 118-120, 140-3, 152-4.)
Now we will let each party give his own account of what
was said between them on the subject of their arrangements
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with respect to either this first Hill Field job, or with reference to any series of jobs or operations which they might
have expected or anticipated working together upon.
As to the First Hill Field Job, Dunkley testified :
"The arrangement on the job was that Huber
and I would go up and do the work without pay, that
is, without a set salary, and whatever profits there
was in the job would be split equally between Newman, Huber and myself. We went ahead and done
the work on that arrangement. (Rec. p. 119.)
As to general working agre·ement on a series of jobs, if
any, Dunkley testified:
"We had no arrangements as to how long it
would last. It was just an arrangement from job to
job. When we took a job and finished it, if we wanted
another one we would go to another one. No definite
time on it. If we finished one job and decided when
it was finished to take another one, we took another
one if it was mutually agreeable to all concerned.
(Rec. p. 133.)
NOTE: This testimony contradicted and thereby destroyed
and disproved his allegations in the complaint and amended
complaint that there was a general partnership agreement to comprehend all jobs they might get in the intermountain district from the forepart of April, 1942 that
were still in existence when this suit was started on Oct.
13:, 1942, which they prayed the court to dissolve and order
an accounting and other relief.

But compare Newman's testimony covering the same
period of time and also the first Hill Field job :
As to a general working agree·ment, if any, Newman
testified:
"I had a large job at that time out at Kearns,
Utah, and one at the Airport, and I was fully occupied. I had too much to do, too much equipment td
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look after. So I told Huber and Dunkley, I says, I
have got more work than I can handle myself. If you
fellows want to go out and take some jobs I will
furnish the equipment, make the payroll, and share
the profit with you. I said, you can work for me and
I will split the profit." (Rec. 203-206.)

As to the First Hill Field Job, Newman testified:
"They were in my house one night. We used to
be friends. I got a telephone from Capt. Beener
at Hill Field saying, 'The Army Engineers say you
have some equipment to do a rush job and to get hold
of you. Can you get some trucks up here in the morning?' He wanted about 12 trucks. He says, 'How
much?' I says, '$2.65 a yard.' I says, 'I am awfully
busy but I have a couple of fellows here, I will send
them up with some trucks and they will come up and
supervise it.' So I says to Ed Huber, at $2.65 a yard
we ought to make 50 cts. a yard profit on it; let's get
some trucks and go up there. He said 'Yes,' and so they
did. And that is the way it started. That was about
the first of April, 1942. Mr. Dunkley was supposed to
have been a timekeeper; Huber was supposed to have
been the man. I told him to hire all the trucks he
could. I would be safe to say that out of the ten trucks
that started up next morning I hired at least seven of
them in the next fifteen minutes over my telephone.
(Rec. 203-205.)
There is not so much difference between the versions
of the facts given by Dunkley and Newman as there is in
their conclusions. But whatever the difference was, it was
the duty of the trial court to have decided it by an appropriate finding of fact. It neglected to do so. Its omission was
reversible error. ante page 19.
Very evidently the plaintiffs and their counsel counted
heavily on the profit sharing feature of whatever the ar-
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rangement was, to clinch their contention that there was
a partnership, and a general one at that. The trial court
appeared to share that view also, to judge from certain of
his remarks in the record, although he never made such a
finding of fact or decree to account. But that viewpoint is
unjustified. It is a question of intention of the parties to
be drawn from all the evidence. If plaintiffs were working
for defendant and were to get a share of the profits in lieu
of a stated salary on jobs that belonged to defendant Newman, they were still employees.
"A party who, without being interested in property is, by agreement, to receive as compensation for
his services, and only as compensation, a certain proportion of the profits, and is neither held out to the
world as a partner nor, through the negligence of
the owner permitted to hold himself out to the world
as a partner, is not a partner either as to the owner
or third persons."
Shepard v. Pratt, 16 Kan. 209; 27 Pac. States
Rep.209;
Lefevre v. Castiagnino, 5 Colo. 564;
Mason v. Hackett, 4 Nev. 420;
In re Andersen's Estate, 198 Pac. 236, (Okl.) ;
Parchen v. Andierson, 5· Pac. 588 (Mont.);
Michener v. Fransham, 81 Pac. 953 (Mont.) ;
Beard v. Rowland et al., 81 Pac. 188 (Kan.) ;
Wade v. Hornaday, 140 Pac. 870 (Kan.);
Weiland v. Sell, 109 Pac. 771 (Kan.);
Tate v. Crooks, 68 Pac. 74;
47 Corp. Jur., 667-674, sees. 61-66.
Many a corporation or business concern makes arrangements by which its employees get a share of the profits to stimulate effort, without bringing them into partnership or joint ownership of the business.
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We shall not persevere to sketch the evidence under
the many different issues in the pleadings. The issues are
too numerous, the testimony too voluminous, the work of
segregation too great. There was evidence upon which the
trial court could and should have made findings of fact responsive to each of the issues. And it should then have
decreed the recreant party or parties to account to the
other. Nevertheless we find it inexpedient to leave the
entire field of evidence and proceedings during the trial
as a sort of terra incognito in view of its bearing upon
certain of the questions subsequently arising for discussion
in this brief.
In summary, therefore, we may say that there was ample evidence in the record to have sustained findings of fact
by the court to the following effect. Beginning with the
first Hill Field job early in April, 1942, referred to above,
and spaced at intervals thereafter during the months of
April, May and June, 1942, there were several "small jobs"
as they were termed by the parties, that came up, and the
work was done by men and equipment furnished either by
defendant Newman himself or by others that were hired
and paid for by defendant's funds provided for meeting
the pay roll. They were jobs running in amount from
$550.00 to $3,500.00. Most of these small jobs were upon
contracts or agreements made and undertaken by defendant Newman in his own name and on his responsibility.
But in the case of two or three of them they were procured
and taken by plaintiffs in their names, being put in the
way of obtaining them by their employment on the Newman jobs. But the means of performance of each and all
of them were provided by defendant's funds to meet the
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pay rolls. In some of them he provided the major part of
the equipment and trucks himself; in others he hired and
paid them. In the force of men and trucks employed, the
plaintiffs had and furnished one truck each, for which they
were paid a rental compensation on the same basis as the
rentals paid for other trucks employed on the jobs, as part
of the expenses of doing the work. The plaintiffs were
employed on these jobs to supervise them, keep account of
the men and equipment employed, the amounts earned by
each, see that they were kept steadily at work and make
reports to defendant Newman who frequently made running
trips for personal inspection and return to his other and
larger jobs in which the plaintiffs had no concern. It was
also part of plaintiffs' employment duties to look after such
matters as repairs and supplies of oil, grease and gas to
keep the trucks in running order. Instead of being paid a
.stated salary for these services they were given each a onethird share of the net profits after all bills were paid. And
a settlement was made with them at the end of each job, or
as soon as the returns from the work came in, and they were
.paid accordingly by defendant Newman.
As stated, the jobs were small ones, requiring only
from about a week to two or three weeks per job to complete them. So that they were not kept constantly employed,
but recurrently as each job came up or presented itself arid
the contract taken. To summarize each of these jobs in
turn:
The First Hill Field Job
(See partial summary ante p. 26.)
Newman testified:
"I furnished most of the equipment up there.
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Figuring all the way through I always had anyway
ten times more equipment than they did. I hired
most of it all the way through. I was the fellow who
was known. I got people to work for me. They liked
to work for me. I maintained all the pay rolls. I did
this on the first Hill Field job.
"Mr. Dunkley was supposed to have been the
bookkeeper and time keeper. I had Mr. Bacon employed as bookkeeper but he had too much work to
do, I knew he was getting back on it.
"I collected the money and divided the profit
with them." (Rec. pp. 206-7.)

The Second Hill Field Job

Dunkley testified:
"This job was about a week after the first Hill
Field job. Capt. Beener wanted some trucks as on
the previous job. The job was in Victor Newman's
name. We worked ten days or so. I turned in the
time, Mr. Bacon made the checks, and they were paid
through Mr. Newman. Some capital was necessary
and Mr. Newman furnished that. We completed the
job and split the profit equally. Mr. Newman had
several jobs of his own that we didn't have anything
to do with." (Rec. pp. 120-1, 155-7.)
Newman testified:
"I maintained the payrolls for everything. I
paid the money for trucks on all the various jobs.
When I got through with this second job I never
charged the job at all. In fact I did it more to help
Huber out because he was a good friend of mine. I
never mingled it with my other pay-rolls because I
wanted Mr. Dunkley to keep the payrolls separate
and apart from my other line of business. My bookkeeper was overworked." (Rec. pp. 207-8.)
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The McKee Job
Dunkley:

"Next after the second Hill Field job was the
McKee job. The job was a sub-contract in Huber
and Dunkley's name and the arrangement was the
same as on the previous jobs. A rental was paid for
equipment and any profits were split between the
three of us. Mr. Newman took care of the pay roll.
The contract was at 22 cts. a yard and the total price
$1800 or $2000." (Rec. 121-2, 157-8.)
Newman:

On this job I quoted the price and everything
but apparently they took it in their names. I maintained the payrolls and everything. They kept the
accounts and I shared the profit with them, over
the equipment expense.
"I had plenty to do in my regular work or business. I had several big jobs. Mr. Poulson, president
of American Contractors, would call me up and say:
'Vic, you can do this. Why don't you do this. You
can move more dirt around here than any contractor
in the intermountain district. You can get a way to
get this stuff moved.' And I figured I was more or
less doing Huber a favor because they couldn't get
equipment in 1942.
"The same was true as to the Poulson job and
the Supply Depot job." (Rec. pp. 209, 210.)
The· Poulson Construction Co. Job
Dunkley:

"After the McKee job, Mr. Newman took another job at Hill Field from the Poulson Construction Co. The same arrangements with Mr. N.ewman
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as on the previous jobs, split the profit three ways
after the bills were paid. The contract was for $3500
at so much per yard." (Rec. 122, 160-1.)

The Supply Depot Job
Dunkley:
"That was a contract for about $1200. I furnished one truck and was paid for it. These were
all short jobs ; none lasted over 2 or 3 weeks. A
satisfactory settlement was made." (Rec. pp. 161,
163.)

The Roy, Utah Job
Dunkley:
Witness testified to this job in the same terms
as he did to the last one, the Supply Depot job.
THE COURT: I am listening to this only to
show the nature of their dealings in the past in
order to try and determine their relations on the
three jobs that we have here in dispute. (Rec. 164-6.)

Newman:
"They were successful in landing a small job
from Tom Rowlands at Roy, Utah, and we shared
a small profit on that. I was up there several times
checking on it to see if they were making or losing
money." (Rec. 210, 211.)

The Stearns--Rogers Job
Dunkley:
"That was a contract job of Mr. Newman's at
8th South and 6th West streets. Check was made
to Huber and Dunkley. We received all the proceeds,
Mr. Newman took care of the pay roll. That job was
about $550. We asked him for an accounting, to
know how much was spent; he has to know how
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much the job cost him. We held the check there and
finally when we needed the money at Wen dover it
was put into the fund to help pay the help there. I
deposited it in the Huber & Dunkley bank account.
That was about the middle of June (1942) ." (Rec.
pp. 167-9.)
The above completes the list of small jobs transacted
under the arrangements between these parties during the
three months of April-May-June, 1942. Satisfactory settlements were made on each of them unless it be the last one,
which leaves the account open as to the $550 and the final
use of that sum by the plaintiffs. The testimony was offered
and considered by the court only to throw any light therefrom on the subsequent dealings between the parties. There
was no direct connection between the different jobs. Each
arose in its turn, the work done and settlements were made
without reference to any possible future jobs.

JOBS MENTIONED IN THE PLEADINGS
Now we take up the four jobs mentioned in the pleadings in their order of time of commencement of each, viz.:
The Fort Douglas job, the Harrison-Dorman job, the railroad job, and the Hospital job. The Fort Douglas job is
the last mentioned in the pleadings (see fourth defense
and counter-claim, Rec. pp. 56-59) but was first commenced
(after completion of the last of the sundry small jobs mentioned supra). It was begun about the last day of June or
first of July, 1942. The plaintiffs worked on it as employees
of the defendant but on the understanding that he would
divide the clear profits with them in return for their careful
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and effective supervision of the work and the keeping of
careful and accurate accounts of the work done, and do a
complete job. They worked on it about two weeks, then report~d to defendant that the job was complete, at a net
profit of $5,400. The defendant was highly gratified, believing the job to be complete, and paid them $1,000 apiece
pending a settlement with the prime contractors, Jacobson
Construction Company, and moved the plaintiffs to a larger
and more responsible job at Wendover, Utah, where he was
just about closing a contract for heavy construction work
with the Harrison-Dorman Construction Company, estimated to cost when complete about $25,000. There were
special circumstances and conditions attending this job
which caused defendant to let the plaintiffs in on it under
a special profit sharing agreement, that were not present in
any of the other jobs, before or after. (See post p. 39.)
This was about the middle of July, 1942, when the work on
this job was started. It was never completed. Dunkley
testified that he and Huber worked on this Harrison-Dorman job about three weeks, when they quit. (Rec. pp. 38-39.)
It may have been a little longer than three weeks that
plaintiffs worked on this Harrison-Dorman job, unless they
stopped work on it before defendant withdrew his men and
equipment, for the latter worked on it somewhat longer.
Then he also suspended work on it, due to lack of some
allocated material required for the job which the prime
contractors could not obtain, and they could not allow Newman to get ahead on his deliveries of material. During this
enforced suspension of work, defendant Newman took the
other two jobs mentioned in the pleadings, viz.; the railroad job of $2,900, and the Hospital job calling for a dirt

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

fill for a government hospital at Wendover and other haulage to the total amount of 100,000 cubic yards at 59 cents
per cubic yard. Then the plaintiffs were put to work on
these jobs by defendant. But there is evidence that owing
to dissatisfaction with plaintiffs' work, and other causes,
the defendant about the middle of August, 1942, gave plaintiffs to understand that the profit sharing feature was
through, and out of the picture; and that if they wanted
to continue at work for him on a weekly salary of $100 a
week they could do so; e~se they could quit. They did continue at work on that agreement until on or about Sept.
3rd, 1942, when Huber stopped and went at something else.
But Dunkley worked two or three weeks longer at $100 a
week, then he quit; and there have been no further dealings
between he or Huber and defendant Newman. And Newman did not finally complete the hospital job until January,
21, 1943, which he did on his sole responsibility, cost and
expense.
We now summarize the testimony of both Dunkley
(Huber did not testify) and Newman with respect to each
of these four jobs mentioned in the pleadings, viz.:

The Fort Douglas Job
Dunkley:

"We next went to the Fort Douglas job, the
contract for which was taken by Mr. Newman in his
own name from Jacobson Construction Company, at
the contract price of $10,000. Mr. Newman says:
'Let's, go up and take the job,'-whch means the
same as any other job. Yes, that job was bid and
accepted while I was out at the Stearns-Rogers job.
Huber and I supervised the job. I told the fellows
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what to do and where to work, kept the time from
day to day, and gave it to Mr. Bacon (Newman's
bookkeeper). All I did was relaying the information
to him ; he was supposed to keep track of it and
know how much we had coming. Mr. Newman paid
each of us $1000 on that job; then we went over to
Wendover." (Rec. 167-8.)
(This witness also spoke of himself as a partner
on this job, but this was a mere conclusion from unstated facts, to be stricken out or disregarded. Shepard v. Pratt, 16 Kan. 209; 27 Pac. Stat. Rep. 209.)

Newman:
In June, 1942, I had a contract at Fort Douglas
for the grading of six or seven acres. My bid of
$10,000 for the job was accepted. At the time I was
terribly busy on a job at Kearns for Gibbons & Reed
Construction Co. So I says to Ralph Dunkley, I am
going to rough grade this off. I can get a plenty of
equipment. All that Huber and Dunkley had was a
truck apiece. I told them to hire any truck they
could find. They supervised the job, but did not
stay on the job until completed. They reported to
me that it was completed at an expense of only $4600
showing a profit of $5400. I figured that was about
half profit. I said, that's fine; are you sure the job
is going to pass inspection? They said, oh, yes. I
gave them $1000 apiece.
"They reported it was finished and left the. job.
I later discovered that it wasn't finished. Capt.
Harris forced me back up there. The job was stymied
up there for a week. I had to pay out $2800 besides
the use of my equipment to finish it. They misrepresented when they said the job made money and I
gave them $2000. They took all the profits and I
didn't quite break even. Think I lost $400 or $500."
(Rec. 211-215, 230.)
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The Harrison-Dorman Job

The contract for this job was taken by defendant Newman with the Harrison Construction Company about the
middle of July, 1942, about the time plaintiffs stopped work
on the Fort Douglas job, and before it was known they had
"fluked" him on the Fort Douglas job and gotten away with
all the profits. They still had Newman's confidence, and
were regarded as his friends. He thought he could now
trust them with a little more responsibility and on a larger
job. And there were special features of this job that led
Newman to cut them in for a profit that was not present in
the other jobs.
The parties testified :
Dunkley:

"Mr. Newman took the contract on the Harrisonnorman job and Huber and I went over to Wendover
and worked on it, the same as on any· other job that
we had had previous, and the arrangements were
the same. (Rec. 123, 129.)
"Under the arrangem·ents the equipment rental
would be paid, nobody would draw a salary, we would
devote our time and efforts, and the profits split
three ways. That was to be our compensation. (Rec.
125, 178.)
"The contract was 80 cents a yard for fill and
$2.80 a yard for concrete aggregate. That was bid
by Mr. Newman and he received the contract on it.
I did the same work as on every other job. (Rec.
17·9.)
"I stayed on the Harrison-Dorman job three
weeks. I did not finish it. I never went back to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
job and don't know whether Newman did, nor what
he did after I left. (Rec. 186.)
"The Curtis Gravel Co. completed the job. We
intended to finish it but started work on the hospital
job, and didn't go back on the Harrison-Dorman job
any more. (Rec. 189, 190.)
"On this Harrison-Dorman job the sand and
gravel, called aggregate, came from across the line
in Nevada." (Rec. 197.)

Newman:
"On the Harrison-Dorman job. Huber had an
I. C. C. right to haul aggregate from Nevada into
Utah. He is the only one who had that right, and at
that time that was the only aggregate that was available in Wendover. So I couldn't bid on the job to
furnish aggregate without Huber hauling it. I bid
the price to Harrison-Dorman at $2.80 a yard.
"So I says to Ed (Huber), 'Look, Ed, that is
about half fill and half aggregate. We will go in on
that together. You furnish the aggregate and I will
furnish the fill. We will use our trucks on the fill
2 or 3 days, and then you take all of them and haul
the aggregate over.' He says, 'that is fine.'
"I says: 'You have got the aggregate and I have
got the equipment to make this earth fill in there.
We will run the jobs together and split the profits.
We will give Dunkley a third of it if he will keep
accurate books of how much it costs to haul the
aggregate, and how much it costs to haul the fill.' So
that was the set up.
"That was a big job at the time. It was $25,000
if we finished it. But that was separate from these
other little jobs.
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"We were on that job roughly a month or more.
I furnished the money for the payrolls, all except
$284. I entered into the contract with Harrisonnorman Construction Company. The contract was
solely with m~. I took care of the payroll.
"For the first couple of weeks on that job Ralph
(Dunkley) would write out the checks and I would
sign them. But there were times when I was working at the Airport and couldn't get out there. So,
Ralph Dunkley says, 'why didn't I put some money
in bank and let him make the pay roll with it.' So
I says, 'all right.' They got a Huber & Dunkley check
book made. They never had one up to that time.
And I deposited in bank about $12,000 in their account on the Harrison-Dorman job, and they wrote
out the payroll.
"Q. What progress was made on the Harrisonnorman job?
"A. For lack of some allocated steel material
the job stopped. We couldn't haul any more dirt.
We did not finish the job. They raised the job,made it bigger than it was at first.
"We got some estimates from the army engineers
out there. One part of it was 100% done, another
was 80%, and one 5.0%. The whole should have been
about 65% complete. We left it because we couldn't
do any more until they got this allocated material.
"Q. I suppose they paid you for what you had
done?
"A. No, we still have it coming. The Harrisonnorman job definitely lost $7000. I told Huber and
Dunkley how much money I had taken in on that job,
which was $15,900, and we spent out $22,000. (Rec.
pp. 215-219, 228-9.)

"I think Harrison-Dorman finally took a little
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more dirt down there. They were hauling material
to three jobs from one pit. (Rec. 219, 220.)
"They (Huber and Dunkley) said, 'We are
getting paid barrow-pit, we are selling some to the
Geer job, some to the Harrison-Dorman job, and
some to the railroad job.'" (Rec. 220.)
NOTE: The Geer job here mentioned by the witness was not
one of the jobs mentioned in the pleadings, and no accounting was sought in respect of it. From later testimony it appears that this was a sort of side job or speculation undertaken by plaintiffs on their own account,
financed out of Newman's funds and equipment, but proceeds appropriated to their own use, and no accounting
made to defendant on it.

The Hospital Job
Dunkley:
"We had the same arrangements with Mr. Newman on this job as on every other job. It was taken
on a straight contract in Mr. Newman's name and on
his bid of 59 cents per cubic yard, estimated to be
$59,000 on 100,000 cubic yards. The last dirt on that
job was hauled Sept. 3rd, 1942. I had one truck on
that job at the agreed compensation of $3 per hour."
(Rec. 190-192.)

Newman:
"When I left the Harrison-Dorman job I negotiated another with Col. Thomas on the 'hospital job.'
At that time I had no agreement with Huber and
Dunkley as to the status of the Harrison-Dorman job.
We thought we would figure up but we couldn't do
nothing for three weeks, so I told Huber and Dunkley
I would give them $100 a week to help me on the
hospital job. That was about Aug. lOth when I was
awarded the contract on the hospital job. (Rec. 219'220.)
"This conversation that I had with Huber and
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Dunkley, at their trailer house, was between the lOth
and 15th of August. I said, I have lost money on the
last two jobs; I am going to try to get back the
money I had lost, off of the hospital job. I am not
going to share no profits. If you want to work for
m-e for $100 a week, all right; if not, all right. (Rec.
270-271.)
"In this conversation in the trailer, I just told
them that the two jobs lost money, and that if they
·couldn't run them at a profit !would like to make
other arrangements. I told them they could work for
me at $100 a week. (Rec. 276.)
"I told them that I wasn't going to share the
profits with them; that I was going to buy a shovel
from the hospital job. For this $100 a week Mr. Huber
was to be foreman on the job. He didn't like it. He
didn't say whether he would work or wouldn't. I told
them that is what they would get if they wanted to
work. (Rec. 2'77-278.)
"I told them definitely before the hospital job was
started that they were not to share in the profits, if
there were any profits. I knew they were inefficient
by Aug. 15th, but all these jobs were run together for
15 days. There were four jobs all tangled up together,
and I told them, I says: 'Finish these jobs and keep
separate accounts of it.' (Rec. 297, 299, 301.)
"I figured that I had to hire them because these
other jobs were not completed; the Harrison-Dorman
job, for instance. I thought if they would stay there
and do as I directed them for $100 a week, I could get
by until the Harrison-Dorman job and the railroad
job were completed. And I figured that I could make
enough money out of the hospital job to compensate me
for the loss that I incurred while they were running
the Harrison-Dorman job for me,-a loss of $7,000;
and the railroad job, a loss of $400 and some dollars.
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In fact they were all losses except the Hospital job,
and that just about evened up the losses. They were
supposed to be my friends, to that time. I knew they
hadn't made me any money, but I knew that they could
if they did the work as I directed it. (Rec. 279-281.)
"I knew they had the ability to do the job right
if they wanted to, and I thought if they would work for
me by the week and be satisfied, and do as I directed,
I would make some money. (Rec. 283.)
"When I told them they could work on for me at
$100 a week, Huber said he wouldn't do it, or he didn't
want any part of it, or something. (Rec. 271.)
"Q. Did they work for nothing between Aug.
10th-11th-12th and Sept. 1st?

"A. Between Aug. 15th and Sept. 1st we had
about fifteen trucks employed, and they worked on the
Harrison-Dorman job, the railroad job, the hospital
job, and the Geer job. There were four jobs and they
worked on all of them. (Rec. 270-271.)
"Huber and Dunkley both started to work for me
at $100 a week when the hospital job started,-Dunkley also at $100 a week; though Huber said he didn't
like it. (Rec. 274-5.)
"Huber didn't like me saying that; he started
making arrangements for a job at Wendover right
after that. He spent most of his time after that making preparations for that job. (Rec. 221.)
"Q.

"A.
a week.

What did Dunkley say?
He just kept on keeping the books, at $100

"Q. Where are the checks showing he received
$100 a week from Aug. 12th to Sept. 1st?

"A. I would like to look at the date of the checks.
I deposited the money in bank for him to run it, and
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I don't know how much he paid himself, nor Huber
either. I have never seen his checks. I don't know
whether he paid Huber $100 a week, or nothing a
week, for what little time he was there. I would go
out two or three times a week and Huber wasn't there.
"THE COURT: I wonder if you can find the
checks for $100 a week for August, Mr. Morrissey?
"MR. MORRISSEY: No. Those checks in August were probably drawn from the account in Walker
Brothers Bank in the name of Huber & Dunkley, if
drawn. Our checks for Huber and Dunkley are in
September.
"MR. CALISTER: We have every check issued
by Huber & Dunkley all the time they were on the
hospital job as well as on the Harrison-Dorman job
and they will be available to the referee if appointed.
(Rec. 274-5.)
NOTE: The court did not request Mr. Callister to produce
the checks for $100 a week in his possession for inspection.

"I bid the thing contract measurement. Huber
and Dunkley switched on the blow-over and started
hauling dirt on the hospital job. But they were not
giving tickets of the measurements out. That went
along roughly two or three weeks; they were hauling
material on the hospital job, and the railroad job, and
to the Harrison-Dorman job which finally took some
more dirt down there. They were hauling material
to the three jobs from the same pit. (Rec. 219, 220),
and also to the Geer job." (Dunkley, Rec. p. 124.)
Dunkley:
"I acted as bookkeeper on the hospital job and
kept a day-by-day record of the cubic yardage on
that fill from Aug. 11th to Aug. 25th. There was no
actual yardage record kept because when the work
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started Mr. Howe the resident engineer gave Huber
and myself the impression that they were going to
measure it by barrow-pit measurement. Therefore
there were no load tickets given out on the actual
yardage hauled there." (Rec. 338-339.)

Newman:
"I went out there myself, and I said: 'How are
you hauling?' 'How are we getting paid?' They said,
'We are getting paid barrow-pit, the army engineers
is paying; we are selling some to the Geer job, some
to the Harrison-Dorman job, and some to the railroad
job.' (Rec. 220.)
"There were four jobs all tangled up together.
I told them, I says, 'Finish these jobs, keep separate
accounts of it.' I would go out, and they would be
hauling on the hospital job. Then I found out they
were working on the Geer job, and all these jobs
were scattered out and they were all jumbled up and
jumbled together. (Rec. 300.)
"I told them the hospital job was mine, and they
mixed them all up. They were not to share profits
on the hospital job until the time I let them go, no.
That was the understanding we had when the hospital job started that they were not to. They mixed
them all up, and that is where the trouble came. (Rec.
300-1.)
"There were no profits on the railroad job. I
agreed to share profits with them on the HarrisonDorman job only. There was never no understanding
on the railroad job. But there was no profits on the
railroad job.
"They collected and kept the money on the Geer
job themselves. I paid the pay roll and everything,
they took the money and kept it. I met the pay roll,
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figuring it was on the Harrison-Dorman job or the
hospital job. (Rec. 272-274.)
"I severed all connections with tb,em about the
last of August, 1942. I was devoting my time to the
hospital job. I finished the hospital job January 21,
1943. They left me Sept. 3rd, 1942. Mr. Dunkley
worked for me two weeks after that. I have cancelled checks showing $100 a week I gave him, dated
Sept. 6th, lOth, 16th.
"MR. CALLISTER: I don't think there is any
controversy about that. Mr. Dunkley testified to
that. (Rec. 219-220.)
"The hospital job contract was for 100,000 yards
of fill. I had a lot of trouble trying to get an estimate.
So the army engineers- said, 'Why don't you finish
your haul?' I says, 'All right, I will finish the haul
for 31,000 that was still owing on the hospital job.'
And I hauled that to the various locations on the
Wendover air base as the army engineers directed.
So the original hospital job contract was not finished
until Jan. 21, 1943. The dirt that was hauled after
Sept. 16th went to various locations, but I had to do
it in order to get my money from the army engineers.
(Rec. 239, 240.)
"Up until Oct. 19th I had one fair bookkeeper
who was overworked. I kept getting so much work
that I realized I had to get some competent bookkeeper. So I got Mr. Keyes and Mr. Wiscomb from
Salt Lake County shops, and they came out to run
my work. The first month they were in my employ
all they did was to rectify the mistakes that were
made on those other three jobs. Everything had to
be changed that Mr. Dunkley did. I directed him
how to keep the books, but he did not do as I told him.
I paid him $100 a week, but I didn't find this out
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until later. I was taking too much for granted. (Rec.
282.)
"The Harrison-Dorman job wasn't run separately from the other jobs that were going on at the
same time. (Dunkley, Rec. 180.)
"Approximately the 25th of August Mr. Newman told me definitely he did not want to do any
more business with me. At that time we were on
the hospital job. I did not leave it then but at the
end of the job both Huber and I did. That job was
completed,-the last dirt hauled,-on Sept. 3rd, 1942.
(Dunkley, Rec. 134, 195.)
"After the hospital job we just agreed not to
take any more jobs together. We each had jobs of
our own, so we just made the remark that we
wouldn't take any more jobs together. (Dunkley, Rec.
195.)

"I was on the pay roll working for Mr. Newman
after that. The hospital job was completed then. I
worked for Mr. Newman 21;2 weeks after the hospital job was completed on Sept. 3rd, 1942." (Dunkley, Rec. 195.)
The Railroad Job

Dunkley:
NOTE: There was no testimony from Dunkley about the
arrangements with Newman for working on this job. But
there is an occasional reference in his testimony to his
doing work on that job along with, or at the same time,
that he was working on the Harrison-Dorman job and the
Hospital job. (The Author.)

Newman:
"Q. Did you have any dealings with Huber and
Dunkley about the railroad job?

"A. No. I had better explain. The railroad
job was another small job. They can either say that
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they were or were not on that job, it is immaterial,
because the job definitely lost $300 or $400. There
was never no set agreement that they were in it.,
"My shovels loaded the dirt, my bull-dozers scattered the dirt, and different trucks hauled it. Regardless of whether they paid them or I paid them,
it was all my money. The total amount was $2,900.
They left the job when it was about %tJhs completed.
I didn' t say I was going to split the profits with
Huber and Dunkley on 'those jobs,' no. The railroad
job was solely my job alone." (Rec. 223, 228, 230.)
1

The foregoing were all the jobs mentioned in the pleadings. The Geer job was a small job of $1192 taken by
Dunkley on the side while he was performing the duties
of his employment by Mr. Newman on the Harrison-Dorman
and Hospital jobs, and not embraced in the pleadings. The
payroll expenses were paid by Huber and Dunkley by their
checks on the bank account in which Newman had deposited
over $12,000 to finance the payrolls on the other jobs. They
kept the proceeds and made no accounting. For further particulars of the Geer job, see ante pp. 41-45.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE COURT
There is one noticeable and outstanding feature of the
trial that should not, we assume, be overlooked entirely.
That was the lengthy and persevering cross-examination
of defendant Newman by the Court. At the conclusion of
the trial, when counsel for both sides had rested and said
"That is all," the court indicated that it desired to ask Mr.
Newman some questions. The questions asked extended over
the entire range of testimony already covered by counsel
on both sides on direct and cross-examination. It must have
consumed more than an hour of time of the trial. It extends from page 262 to 298 of the record. The writer
hereof was not of counsel at the trial. But on reading the
transcript he is tempted to feel that the court went to
unusual and unjustified lengths. The apparent trend and
scope of the questions was to corner the witness and drive
him into admissions at variance with portions of his testimony which we have quoted (ante pp. 26-48), and in line
with a conception denoted by the form of the questions
asked, to wit: that all and each of the jobs at issue in the
pleadings were done under and pursuant to one uniform
agreement amounting to a partnership, because of the profit
sharing feature; that the services of the plaintiff were the
same in each job; and that they each came to an end on
or about September 3rd, 1942. The court was not altogether
successful in this quest. Again and again the witness refused assent and returned answers consistent with his
previous testimony. Each time the questioner returned to
the attack with questions framed to contain assumptions
not always justified by the witness' previous answers. All
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in all the witness seems to have done more harm in his
answers to the theory on which the questions were framed
than to improve it, notwithstanding the few assents near
the last apparently from sheer weariness. The writer
understands the circumspection required in speaking of
such a situation. Perhaps the most suitable criterion could
be obtained in this way, viz.: The members of this court
are all experienced trial court judges. Should they feel
inclined to read through said pages 262-298 of the record
and note their own reactions, they would probably correspond with that which the writer has experienced.
We think the historic role of a trial court is to act as
impartial umpire between the contending parties, and leave
the questioning of witnesses to the respective counsel.
At the conclusion of the second day's trial the following occurred :

DISCUSSIONS AND RULINGS
THE COURT: It seems to me that these were
joint ventures on all these jobs mentioned in the com·
plaint; that is, the railroad job, the hospital job and
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the Harrison-Dorman job. The hospital job up to
Sept. 3rd.
MR. CALLISTER: I don't think a partner can
cut off some one else and just say that up to this
point we are through.
THE COURT: Here is the thing about that,
though, that Mr. Dunkley at least did accept employment at the rate of $100 a week after that. And he
did quit even that employment at a little later date.
(Rec. 303.)
MR. CALLISTER: That is right, but Mr. Huber
at no time did.
THE COURT: If one partner in a three-way
partnership leaves, that dissolves the whole partnership. Now with respect to Mr. Newman and Mr.
Huber on the balance, there would have to be a new
understanding at that time.
MR. CALLISTER: You take the position that
it is a dissolution at the time one leaves the partner~
ship?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CALLISTER: I assume your honor will
appoint a referee. (Rec. 304.)
THE COURT: Is there any evidence as to when
the Harrison-Dorman job was finished?
MR. CALLISTER : There was some evidence
that it was never finished; they stopped for some
reason and never went back.
THE COURT: The Curtis Sand & Gravel Co.
finished it. I think this joint venture terminated on
Sept. 3rd. I think all the evidence here is Sept. 3rd.
On Sept. 3rd the joint venture in all these operations
ceased at that time.
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MR. MORRISSEY: Up to the F·ort Douglas
there is no controversy.
THE COURT: That is right. (Rec. 305.)
THE COURT: Now the Fort Douglas job, I
think your counter-claim comes into being. I think
everything prior to that job was settled satisfactorily.
There should be a referee appointed to take an accounting of the jobs mentioned in the complaint and
counter-claim and the profits, if any, divided onethird each. (Rec. 306.)
Now, on the hospital job I think they will have
to attempt to figure as near as possible the amount
of profit or loss up to Sept. 3rd * * * I think
the apportionment of the hospital job can be done
before the referee, .and then these gentlemen can be
sworn and testify to whatever the percentage was
that was finished on a certain date.
And the referee shall hear evidence to determine
the result of the accounting, and after he has made
his report to the court, the court will thereafter hear
any obdections to the court's proposed findings,
which will be based on the referee's report. (Rec.
307.)
Can you gentlemen agree upon a referee?
MR. CALLISTER : Has the court anyone in
mind?
T'HE COURT: No. I will want you to prepare·
findings in the nature of an interlocutory decree.
Would you gentlemen want to think over who you
want for a couple of days·?
(Counsel say they have no one in mind.)
THE COURT: Think about it; maybe you can
agree. If you can, just insert the same.
(The Court recesses or adjourns for the day.)
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With respect to the court's observation that it seemed
to the court that "all these jobs mentioned in the complaint
were joint ventures," we have to say that this was at most
a conclusion of law from facts that had not been found or
stated in writing, as required by code 104-27-6. It did not
purport to meet and dispos·e of all or any of the issues
framed in the complaint, answer and counterclaims. It
did not constitute a finding of fact upon all or any of the
evidence within the issues, nor upon the evidence which
we have quoted or summarized in the preceding pages. Had
the court made a written finding of fact in response to the
issue whether a partnership had been created by acts or
words of the parties, and had decided that upon those facts
a partnership, or a joint venture, had resulted; then we
could have assigned as error that the finding is unsupported
by evidence, or is contrary to undisputed evidence, or contrary to the great preponderance and weight of the evidence. Or, had it found upon evidence within the issues
that defendant had breached his duty as a partner, or a
joint adventurer, creating a duty to account, we could have
laid error to that finding. Likewise on each of the other
issues, both in the complaint, answer and counter-claim,
both affirmative and negative, an express and specific written finding of fact was required, with conclusions of law,
and a decree that one party account to the other.
The findings should also have conformed to the implication in the court's remarks, that the joint venture came
to an end on September 3rd, 1942. The court indicated
that it desired to make findings and a decree that one party
or the other should account. It invited plaintiffs' counsel
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to prepare such findings. But none were ever prepared,
served, signed, or filed, so as to become part of the judgment roll and record on appeal.
Until adequate findings of fact responsive to each issue
in the pleadings, both affirmative and negative, were prepared, signed, and filed, it was premature for the court to
even consider the appointment of a referee to take and state
an account. To actually make such an order without findings and decree was error both jurisdictional and pro..
cedural. See ante pages 14-18.
Nevertheless, there was a minute order entry by the
clerk purporting to appoint a referee (Rec. 72), dated
April 6, 1942; and later a formal written order appointing
Wallace Dansie to act as referee dated April 24, 1942 (Rec.
74-76).
Aside from the foregoing there were no further proceedings in the action, and no filings made, until June 3,
1942, when the court resumed its sittings in this case, as
denoted by the bill of exceptions (Rec. 309).
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THE ORDER OF REFERENCE

Without any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or
decree to account, the court on April 24, 1942, twelve days
after the court recessed on April 6th, 1943, entered a
minute order (Rec. p. 77) and on the same day a more
formal written order appointing Mr. Wallace Dansie referee of the court in this action (Rec. pp. 74-76), requiring
the parties to appear before him and submit their books
and papers. The order was void because without jurisdiction, in that there were no findings of fact, or conclusions
upon evidence within the issues in the pleadings establishing partnership or other relation, or any breach of duty arising therefrom, and no decree ordering that either party
account to the other. It was void for the further reason
that, had such findings, conclusions and decree to account
been previously made, it would have required that the
party liable and decreed to account, forthwith file a statement of his account with the opposing party, showing separately the debits and credits in account; i.e., the receipts
and disbursements. And the opposite party would thereupon have been required to move or plead to such account,
file objections to specific items, and (if desired) to file
any counter-statement of account claiming additional items
of credit or debit supplementing those in the statement
first filed. That is, each party would "surcharge and falsify" the items in the opposing statement of account, according to settled equity or chancery practice. That is, the parties would be required to plead and come to an issue or
issues affecting specific items of the account filed, on the
one hand, and on specific items in the counter statement
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of account, if any, on the other. This was the settled practice before the codes, of which the code references are the
continuation and counterpart. The referee under the code is
said to be a substitute for the old master in chancery with
the same powers and duties unless otherwise specifically
prescribed by law. See cases cited below.
"The purpose of this requirement is to cause the
parties to so plead as to limit the proofs on either
side to the specific items in account as to which
specific issue has been taken, and save the time of
the court or referee on the trial of such issues."
63 Corp. Jur., 720, References, sec. 110;
Milt'on v. Richardson, 47 N. Y. Supp. 735;
Moore v. Reinhart, 117 N. Y. Supp. 534;
Myers v. Bennett, 3 Lea (71 Tenn.), 184;
Wiggin v. Gans, 61 N.Y. Super. Ct., 646;
1 Corp. Jur., Seg. page 684, note 15 and cases;
53 Corp. Jur., page 735, note 2-3 et cit.;
Fed. Eq. Rules, rule 79 (new rule 6v, 198 Fed.
xxxvii);
Beckwith v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 207 Fed.
848.
"The purpose of Equity Rule 79 (new rule 63,
198 Fed. xxxvii) is to limit the trial before the master
to the disputed items."
Beckwith v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 207 Fed.
848.
"The parties should be required to furnish statements of account so that the clerk and master may
be able to see the points of real difference, and to
limit the proofs to those points."
Myers v. Bennett, and other cases supra.
It may be that the court might, in its order of reference, instruct the referee to cause the parties to file their

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

57
statement, counter-statement, objections and exceptions before him, as a part of his duties under the order of reference, and so come to an issue or issues delimiting the proofs
on the trial before him, and to report the same together
with the proofs taken pursuant thereto, along with the
referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and proposed
decree, for action by the court. If so, no such order was
made by the court in its order of reference. Nor was any
such statement of account, counter account, objections to
specific items, or other pleading filed either before the
court or its referee. And so there was no cause pending for
trial involving any items of account, or issues thereon, before either the court or the referee. And so there was no
jurisdiction to proceed to the taking or settlement of an
account by either the court or the referee.
A court is without jurisdiction to conduct a trial of
any issue of fact or law in the absence of a written pleading defining the issue to be tried and limiting the proofs
thereto. In the case of the original pleadings it is the complaint, answer, counter-claim and reply which produce the
issues, or a demurrer to any of these. At any later stage,
or upon any collateral question, there must be some petition,
affidavit or other verified statement of claim or account
which defines or tenders the issue to be tried, and confers
jurisdiction on the court. There must be some bounds, so
that the evidence and findings of fact may conform to the
issue to be tried.

Hillyard v. District Court, 68 Utah 220; 249
Pac. 806;
Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 558; 37 Pac. 2d 777;
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 14; 235 Pac. 580.
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"No court has a right to go beyond the issues
tried in rendering a judgment."
Thompson v. Reynolds, 174 Pac. 164, 15·7
(Utah);
Rosenthyne v. McCulloch Co., 168 Pac. 957
(Utah).
"A court's jurisdiction depends upon a pleading
as the judicial means of investigation, and a judgment not supported by a sufficient pleading is void
for all purposes and subject to collateral attack."
In re Evans, 42 Utah 292; 130 Pac. 217.
This view is apparent also from our code sections governing procedure before a referee. Section 104-27-6 empowers a referee among other things to permit admendments to the pleadings. What pleadings? It cannot mean
the original complaint and answer creating the issues as
to relationship and breach of duty, upon the decision of
which by the court depends a party's obligation to render
an account to his adversary. Those issues have been or
must be settled by the court's decree ordering one party to
account to the other. Those issues must have gone to a
decision and judgment, and the pleadings become functus
officio before the case ever reaches a referee. Perhaps the
decree to account has been affirmed on appeal to the
Supreme Court. Code section 104-27-6 could not have meant
that the referee might go back and rip up the decree and
permit admendments that would unsettle the court's decree.
Manifestly, it means that the referee could permit amendments to the pleadings which define the issue he is called
upon to try, viz. : the statement of account and the disputed
items thereof, filed in obedience to the decree to account.
Inasmuch as there was never any petition, affidavit,
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or statement of claim or account, or objections to items
thereof, filed with the court, nor by the court's order filed
with the referee defining or limiting issues in accounting
to specific items of debit or credit in account, there was no
jurisdiction to proceed to the trial of any such question.
And the court could confer no such jurisdiction up'on the
referee to try a non-existent issue of fact or law. The order
of reference to Mr. Dansie as referee was therefore without jurisdiction and void.

COURT PROCEEDINGS JUNE 3RD, 1943
Such was the state of the record when, on June 3rd,
1943, the Court resumed its session in this case. There had
been a two days trial, April 5th and 6th, 1943, on the issues
as to partnership and liability to. account,' which the trial
court had never decided by any findings of fact, conclusions
or decree ordering either party to account to the other.
There had been a court direction from the bench to plaintiffs' attorney to prepare findings of fact for an interlocutory decree of some sort, which had not been complied with.
There had been a two months vacation or recess, presum-
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ably to permit preparation of findings and decree to account, for approval and signature by the court, and to
enable the referee to hold a trial, settle and state an account
for report to the court, which could then hear exceptions
to the referee's report, and allow or disallow items therein
that might be excepted to by the parties. But none of these
things had been done or transacted by the court or counsel.
The case stood as on the day of adjournment. Not that the
referee had been idle in the meantime. On the contrary the
referee had conducted an inquiry of some sort, and had
made a report to the court of his doings under the order
of reference. This: report was dated May 28, 1943,-six
days before the court resumed its session on June 3, 1943.
But this report was not among the files of the case. As
appeared later, it was in the pocket of plaintiffs' attorney.
But judicially the court knew nothing of it when it convened
again and began to hear testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses.
To what purpose, and on what issue, did the court·
convene again on June 3, 1943 to hear evidence? Certainly
not to conduct again a trial on the question of partnership
or employee relation of the plaintiffs toward the defendant,
or breach of duty growing out of any such relationship.
The court had finished the trial on those questions, announced its conclusions of law from the bench, and directed
the plaintiffs attorney to prepare findings of fact and a
decree. And the court must have intended that the decree
would require one party or the other to account. Else, why
the order of reference to take and state an account between
the parties? However, the plaintiffs counsel had not prepared or served any findings or proposed decree to account.
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Hence the order of reference was void and in excess of
jurisdiction. See cases cited ante pp. 14-19, 57.
Upon what issues then did the trial court meet to conduct a trial and hear testimony on June 3rd, 1943? The
only clue to the purpose of such a trial or hearing, was to
be found in the nature of the testimony itself heard from
the witness stand. That is, instead of a written pleading,
petition, affidavit of fact, or statement of claim, with answer, objections or plea,-defining the issues and limiting
the proofs,-there was to be a complete reversal of the
order of trial. And the court and counsel were to find out
from the evidence what the issues were. Instead of verified
definite issues limiting the proofs, the proofs were to formulate and define the issues as counsel proceeded with examination of his witnesses on the stand. When they got
through the court and opposite party would be supposed to
have found out what the trial was all about.
There was no jurisdiction in the court to proceed in
any such manner. Its attempt to do so was coram non judice
and void. It is as if none of the witnesses had testified.
This applies to all the testimony, rulings and proceedings
recorded in the bill of exceptions from page 309 to 444
inclusive. Because there was no written pleading or statement of fact, and no issue thereon, there was no trial.
A party sued or impleaded is entitled to have the issues
defined by pleadings before he goes to trial thereon, so as
to prepare his case and assemble his witnesses. He does
not have to wait until his opponent has produced an array
of witnesses and caused them to testify in open court in
support of some theoretical and undefined issue of fact,
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before he is obliged to put his own construction on what
issue such testimony tends to support, and proceed to see
what he can do in the way of getting witnesses to disprove
or rebut before the court decides to end the trial and
adjourn.
What we have said applies to each and everything the
plaintiffs sought to prove or establish at this second trial
in the case on June 9, 1942. It applies with special force
also to the document denominated on its face "NEWMAN,
HUBER AND DUNKLEY REPORT ON ACCOUNTING,"
which plaintiffs' counsel finally decided to produce from
his own custody and to offer in evidence as "Plaintiffs' Exhibit E" during the trial (see Rec. p. 316). To which the
Court replied : "I wonder if it wouldn't be better to file it.
It has been identified. I think it would be better to have it
filed right in the case. It may be filed." (Rec. p. 316-7.)
As an article of documentary evidence this exhibit E
had no more effect than any of the other evidence offered at
this hearing, in the absence of any written pleadings or
issues of any sort limiting the proofs. The court had no
jurisdiction to hear any proofs for lack of pleadings and
an issue. The trial was a nullity, testimony and proofs likewise.
Aside from that, what was the reason or excuse for trying to introduce in evidence a referee's report. It was an
unverified document containing numerous unsworn stateents of its author, Mr. Dansie. Even if sworn to, it would
be only an affidavit, not a deposition taken on notice, or
upon a dedimus with interrogatories attached, as required
by the code in taking the deposition of an absent witness.
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And even if these objeetions were out of the way it is not
lawful to read a deposition in evidence unless the witness
is absent and cannot be produced to testify at the trial. But
in this case, the author of the document, deposition, unsworn
statement (whatever it may be termed) was not absent,
but was present on the witness stand and under examination
as a witness at the very instant when the writing Exhjbit
E was produced and offered in evidence by plaintiffs'
counsel.
But counsel, in offering the document Exhibit E, did
not offer it as a deposition or affidavit of the witness, but
he professed to offer it in evidence as,-"his report made as a result of the order of this
court heretofore entered appointing him referee"and asked that "it be admitted in evidence." But we say, as
to this, that no matter what counsel might term or name
the document, if it was being offered in evidence, it was null
and void along with all the other evidence offered upon no
pleadings or other defined issues for trial. Because the
court had no jurisdiction to hear evidence without pleadings
defining an issue and limiting proofs thereto. See In re
EvOJnS, 42 Utah 292, 130 Pac. 217, quoted ante page 58.
If it had been the intention of plaintiffs' counsel to
present and file the document in question, Exhibit E, not
as an article of proof supporting some undefined issue in
the void proceeding, under guise of a trial, but as a referee's
report made in response to a previous order of court appointing him referee,-then another set of questions would
arise. What questions?
1. Was there any valid order of court ever made and
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entered authorizing or empowering the referee to act, or
defining his duties under the order of reference? If not,
the order and everything done under it was a nullity. No
use could be made of such a report when returned into
court and filed. No jurisdiction to appoint a referee,-no
jurisdiction in the referee to act as referee, to conduct any
inquiry, or make any report. Hence the report offered and
filed was not in fact or law what it purported to be, nor
what it was termed or denominated by counsel. It was not
the report of a referee.
2. Should we assume that there was a valid order of
reference to Mr. Dansie as referee, an assumption which
the record contradicts, then was there a trial before the
referee with witnesses produced, sworn and examined, findings made and conclusions of law? We reserve the answer
to this question to the next division of this brief (post pp.
76-98).
3. Were there issues for trial before the referee created by any verified pleadings or statements of itemized
accounts with objections or exceptions pointing out specific
items as the subjects for proof? Answer no. (ante pp. 59-61.)
4. Had the referee's so-called report been filed in
court prior to the opening of this session of court on June
3, 1942, so as to become the subject for objections. and exceptions by defendant, and thereby bring to an issue before
the court any question of law or fact arising upon the referee's report, for trial when the case would be reached for
trial upon the hearing of such objections and exceptions?
The answer is, No, the so-called referee's report was only
now produced from private custody of plaintiffs' counsel
and filed, in the midst of a trial undertaken upon no issues
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whatever. There had been no opportunity at all for defendant's counsel to examine the report, study it, or prepare
objections or exceptions. In the absence thereof, there could
be no issues for trial by the court arising upon the bare production of the report itself by plaintiffs' counsel, without
prior inspection thereof by opposing counsel, or objections
..A. ' ' v_.: _(,~.,
defining a~'\trial by the court.
The bare production and filing of the referee's report,
such as it was, in the midst of the proceedings, could not
and did not produce an issue for trial which was lacking
before. Hence jurisdiction continued lacking and all proceedings were void.
This perhaps renders unnecessary any further attention
to the details of the void proceeding of June 3rd, 1943. But
at the risk of supBrfluity we point out certain remarks of
counsel tending to disclose his own point of view with respect to what he was trying to accomplish by his oral evidence in court in connection with this "report of the referee."
At record page 318 it appears that plaintiffs.' counsel
called the defendant Newman to the witness s.tand and
asked him this question :
"Q. Mr. Newman, have you ever discussed this
report of the referee with Mr. Dansie?"
MR. MORRISSEY: I don't know what materiality it has or what he hopes to prove by it. What
do you want to prove Mr. Callister? Do you want
to contradict the report?
MR. CALLISTER: No, I want to go into this report a little further to show that the report is wrong,
and I feel this is proper. I feel this, your honor, that
this is a hearing to determine our objections to the
report.
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THE COURT: Whether the court will adopt
the report?
MR. CALLISTER: That is right. * * *
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
As to this, we point out that the hearing and testimony
had been going on for quite some time before the court or
opposing counsel knew that there was any so-called report
of a referee, and before the paper called a report was produced and filed. The belated report could not produce an
issue nunc pro tunc at the beginning of the trial that day.
And plaintiffs' counsel had not himself filed any objections
or exceptions to the report either before or since it was
filed, with a statement of his objections to any particular item
therein of debits or credits, and so creating an issue for trial
by the court. We repeat our previous assertion that a party
cannot go to trial on no issue at all of fact or law, and rely upon his proofs or proceedings in court to develop and create an
issue for trial where there was none before or when the trial
opened. Ignoring, for the moment, the fact that plaintiffs'
counsel was in the attitude of both proposing and also in the
same breath attacking and repudiating as "wrong" a document on which he proposed to ask for a sizable judgment
against his opponent, yet at the same time, he could not create
any issue at all for trial by the court, without a previous
pleading of some sort defining the issue to be tried, and serving the same on the opposing counsel, and giving reasonable
time for him to prepare for the trial. And this includes any
objecti.ons to specific items in the report.
In numerous other ways the plaintiffs sought to weaken
and impugn the report in question by questions tending to
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show that it was and is incomplete and therefore inaccurate,
because of the asserted failure of certain persons to co-operate with and furnish the referee with information of an
undefined nature the result whereof, if furnished, would
they contended, have affected the result of the accounting
as proposed by the referee, because of his inability to get.or
obtain the desired information. (Rec. 311-319, and nearly
all the way through.)
While still pursuing this line of inquiry, the counsel
asked for an asserted contract between defendant Newman
and the United States Government in respect to the hospital
job. Upon inquiry by defendant's counsel what he proposed
to show by it, Mr. Callister replied in part as follows:
MR. CALLISTER: * * * Now this court,
up to this date, has not made any findings of fact, or
conclusions of law based on the evidence in this case,
and I feel that the court still has the right to consider
evidence in respect to this case. * * *
At the conclusion of the last hearing it was decided necessary to have a referee. Now based on that
order I find that the referee has only made a report
as of Sept. 3rd, 1942. This court is not bound by the
order appointing a referee at that time. We desire
at this time to offer proof to the effect that * * *
we should have an accounting for the full 100,000
cubic yards.
Here is a distinct statement by counsel that he proposed
to treat this evidence he was offering in court on June 3rd,
1943, as a mere continuation of the original two days trial
that was conducted before the Court on April 5th-6th, 1943,
and with the doors wide open for the reception of evidence
that would not be restrained to the issues tried before the
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Court at that time (namely, that of the existence of a partnership or other fiduciary relations between the parties,
breach of duty, and liability to account), but that his evidence now should include testimony as to matters of account.
And all as part of one continuous trial upon the original
pleadings and issues in the case. In other words instead of
the case being divisible into a trial first on the issues of
relationship and breach of duty creating a liability to account, with findings and decree to account as part I of the
case; and second a trial upon issues framed in the accounting itself to present the items of debit and credit on each
side, to be conducted later by the court or its referee ;-in
lieu of that method established by this court as required by
jurisdictional considerations (ante pp. 14-18), counsel now
proposed to consolidate both into one continuous trial in
which the trial court should both establish and decree relationship and duty to account and also take the account itself
all in one continuous trial. However, counsel did not go so far
as to want to discard the referee's report entirely. He still
wanted to hold on to that, and the figures. in the accounting
therein contained, so long and so far as the same could
be made serviceable to him. But he wished to cancel and
impugn so much thereof as he did not like by other evidence
now to be produced in open court. Or rather, to be more
accurate, the counsel confessed himself unable to produce
evidence that would enlarge the amount allowable to plaintiffs by the terms of the referee's report. But he believed
that 'Such evidence existed in the possession of the defendant, or available to him. And counsel proposed to punish
defendant for not producing these hypothetical figures by
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taxing against him an amount that counsel believed would
accrue to his client if defendant Newman could be made to
"cough up" the information attributed to him by plaintiffs'
counsel. That is, he wanted a judgment not upon evidence
but upon his lack of evidence for which lack he held the unaccommodating defendant responsible.
But even this did not exhaust the range of counsel's versatility in devising new theories and expedients to justify a
range of inquiry already run riot for lack of the restraint
of pleadings and a definite issue. At record page 316 he
asked Mr. Dansie if in his report he had found for plaintiffs in the sum of $13,000, and some odd dollars, and if
that was not based on the assumption that the joint venture
ended as of Sept. 3rd, 1942. To which questions Dansie
answered yes, that is right. And at record page 322 he
asked defendant Newman if he had not testified several
weeks ago that he would have nothing more to do with
plaintiffs on the hospital job, and that he had "kicked them
off the job." To which Newman replied: "That was Aug.
11th; they stayed until Sept. 3rd."
4j..j-L/b

NOTE: See Newman's testimony ante page - , where he says
he told Huber and Dunkley they would not be allowed to
share profits on the hospital job, on the very day he took
the contract from Col. Thomas; but that they could stay
on and work at $100 a week wages, if they cared to, otherwise quit. And that they did remain until Sept. 3rd,
though Huber didn't do much work after Aug. 11th, he
was absent making preparations on a new job of his own
much of the time after Aug. 11th, until Sept. 3rd, when
he quit entirely; but Dunkley continued at work for Newman at $100 a week until Sept. 3rd and for 2 or 2 1h weeks
thereafter.

You kicked them off, didn't you?
"A. No.
"Q. You wouldn't permit them to continue on
it, would you?
"Q.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

70
"A.

That was August 11th.

"Q. You kicked them off; after Sept. 3rd didn't
you tell them you didn't want them on there any
more?
"A. That is right.
"Q. And you said they were no more partners
with you?
"A. I said that Aug. 11th." (Rec. 322, 323.)
NOTE: Aug. 11th, date of Newman's contract on the hospital
job he told these parties he didn't want them as profit
sharers; which means that they never acquired that
status at the outset, and there was no need to "kick"
them off thereafter; they were never on. That is, Newman never breached any contract with plaintiffs to share
profits because he made none. On and after Aug. 11th he
only employed them to work for wages which is not
breached by dismissal at any time with wages paid in full.

MR. CALLISTER: Now based on that report
(of the referee) I find that the referee has only made
a report as of Sept. 3rd, 1942.
THE COURT: That is as he was ordered.
MR. CALLISTER : That is correct. Now the
court is not bound by the order appointing a referee
at this time. We desire at this time to again offer
proof to the effect that, based upon Mr. Newman's
testimony here a few minutes ago that he would not
permit Mr. Huber to continue in this business, that
we should have an accounting for the full 100,00{)
cubic yards.
NOTE: Does not counsel's statement veer toward a theory
that plaintiffs are entitled to a share of the profits which
they might have claimed had defendant Newman seen
fit to take plaintiffs into a partnership or joint venture
with him on the hospital job; or else damages measured
by the profits for his refusal to take them in as partners
or profit sharers?

But why, we inquire, did counsel assume or take for
granted that defendant Newman was obligated in any way
to take plaintiffs in with him as profit sharers on this hos-
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pital job? He had never at any time proved nor obtained a
court finding that Newman had bound himself in any way
to such an undertaking. The testimony we abstracted (ante
pp. 41-47) leads to the opposite conclusion. If there was any
conflict of testimony on that subject, it was upon plaintiffs
to procure a finding of fact by the court which heard all
the evidence on the subject of partnership relations, or employer-employee relations, that there was an over-all agreement to enter into and remain in partnership for some
specified time or duration that would cover all jobs obtained
by Newman in the meantime. Also that plaintiffs paid some
eonsideration or made some contribution that would give
effect to such a promise by Newman. And that the hospital
job was so obtained during the life of the over-all partnership, hence broken when Newman refused to abide by it in
excluding them from profit sharing on the hospital job. But
this theory was annihilated by plaintiff Dunkley's own testimony that each and all of the jobs undertaken was a job-tojob arangement, each separate and independent of all other
jobs, and influenced by no over-all agreement embracing
them all and continued for no time beyond the completion
()f each job in its turn. (ante p. 26.)
And again, we repeat, the question here for consideration is not regarding conflicts of testimony, nor antithetic
contentions of counsel regarding which theory the evidence
establishes, but the question is, which theory is supported
by any written findings of fact by the trial court establishing the contract that was actually made by the parties, and
as to which party breached that contract in a way letting
him in for an accounting to the opposite party. Until such
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a finding of fact has been made by the court, fortified by a
decree to account, the plaintiffs can be in no position to assume, or take for granted, that partnership or joint venture
is an element in their case with respect to any accounting on
this hospital job. Or that they can hold defendant to account
with respect either to the haulage on that job that was completed on Sept. 3rd, 1942, or the total haulage of 100,000
cubic yards that was finally completed in January, 1943,
long after their employment at weekly wages of $100 a week
had terminated. They had no interest in either the one or
the other unless so found and decreed by the court on the
preliminary tria1 in April, 1943.
This last theory of plaintiffs' counsel, as well as each
of its predecessors, do violence to the rule established by this
court (ante p. 14) that in actions of equitable accounting
the plaintiff must in a preliminary trial prove and get a
court finding and decree that defendant is a partner and
liable as such to account, which judgment is final and appealable, before he can proceed to an actual accounting
which, when completed, requires another set of findings and
judgment to determine the amount due. They als.o do violence
to the additional rule, also established by this court's decisions to the effect that there must be pleadings with defined
issues limiting the proofs in any judicial inquiry, to support
the trial court's jurisdiction. So that no matter which theory
counsel prefers to adopt, regarding the relation of the proceedings on June 3, 1943, to those on April 5th and 6th, the
trial court was without jurisdiction to hear testimony or
make any decision depending on issues in accounting when
it convened on June. 3, 1943.
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We have yet to demonstrate, as we will (post pp. 76-98)
that the referee's report was and is null and void from beginning to end, that it is no more than a batch of unsworn
written hearsay picked up by the referee from private inquiry out of the presence of defendant or his counsel, and
without legal standing either as evidence or as a referee's
report to the court. Hence that it can not be looked to either
as substantive evidence in itself, or to supplement or piece
out the testimony in open court on June 3, 1943, as a basis
for determining the state of accounts between the parties
to this action. And the trial court had no jurisdiction to
consider either the one or the other, in view that it was proceeding without jurisdiction to try immaginary or conjectural issues in accounting, without any prior court findings
of fact and decree to account, nor to review that kind of a
non-existent record of a non-judicial inquiry, nor substitute
its own judgment for that of the referee regarding the evidential value of supposed facts gathered by mere inquiry,
telephoning or chatting with unknown persons. The court
is forbidden by law to listen to mere gossip in or out of court,
and so is the referee under the code sections cited infra p.
78. And the court could not sanction such transgression
of law by the referee by revising the referee's judgment of
the evidential value of supposed facts thus gathered.
On the other hand, there are insufficient figures given
on the witness stand in the court's session of June 3, 1942,
(regardless of the absence of any issues in accounting),
from which the trial court could have constructed a set of
findings of fact of its own, and from which it could
possibly have settled a statement of account between the
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parties, with itemized debits and credits, and a net balance struck after all expenses of operation were deducted
from gross earnings. For only the balance could in any
event be divided.
The proceedings in open court on June 3rd, 1943, were
void because in excess of or without jurisdiction, and they
afford no. support for the findings and judgment of the
court against defendant for $19,451.03 or any other amount.
We have been thus meticulous about this matter, bearing in mind, as we do, that this court has held the rule to
be in actions involving a reference to a referee to take
evidence and report, that the referee's report (assuming
it to be a valid report based upon a trial of defined issues
and upon a lawful and valid order of reference), is advisory only, the same as a jury's verdict would be when
empannelled to try specific issues in an equity action. And
that the court may adopt and approve the referee's findings
or the jury's verdict, or reject it, and make its own findings
of fact on the evidence adduced before both court and jury.
(See cases cited infra, pag·e 98.) In line with the rule
recognized in those cases, if the referee in this case had
conducted a trial upon testimony of witnesses sworn and
examined by counsel, and had reported the testimony so
taken to the court with his own findings and determination of the issues limiting the proofs, as required by law,
(assuming a valid order of reference in the first instance),
in such case the trial court could read through the evidence
so taken and reported by the referee, place its own judgment thereon, make findings de novo, and disregard those
of the referee.
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But in the case at bar, not only has the referee not
reported back to the court any evidence or testimony taken
before him, on which the court might substitute its own
judgment and findings for that of the referee; but, as
a matter of fact, the referee never conducted a trial, never
heard any testimony of sworn witnesses in the presence
of counsel for both parties; never followed any defined
issues in making his private and off-the-record inquiries,
or in his tireless pursuit of hearsay unsworn statements
made by no one knows whom. The trial court could not
review that kind of non-existent record of non-judicial inquiry, nor substitute its own judgment thereon in lieu of
that of the referee. The court is forbidden by law to listen
to mere unsworn hearsay in or out of court, and it cannot sanction such by attempting to revise the referee's
judgment on the evidential value of such unsworn hearsay.
On the other hand, there are no sufficient figures in accounting testified in open court upon the witness stand,
from which could have been constructed a complete set
of fact findings to the trial court's own liking. And in
such case this court cannot take upon itself that impossible
burden as a substitute for the neglect of the trial court to
attempt it.
There were neither pleadings defining an issue, nor
proofs independent of an issue, nor yet findings of fact
by the trial court upon evidence, to sustain the trial court's
judgment in this case. The proceedings in court on
June 3rd, 1943, were absolutely void for lack of pleadings
and a defined issue to support the same and confer jurisdiction. Coram non judice.
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THE REFEREE'S REPORT
(Appendix, post p. 116.)
However, had there been a lawful order of reference
appointing Mr. Dansie referee, plus issues to which the
proofs before him might have been directed, it does not
appear that Mr. Dansie ever qualified as referee by taking
the constitutional oath of office. Utah Const. Art. IV, sec.
10 provides that:
"All officers made elective or appointive by this
Constitution, or by the laws made in pursuance hereof, before entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following
oath or affirmation." (Form of oath set out.)
And Utah Annot. Code, 1943, HM-27-7 : "The referee before proceeding to hear any evidence must be s.worn well and truly to hear and determine the facts referred to him and true findings
render according to the evidence, and he may administer oaths to witnesses."
Within our restricted time for preparing this brief
we have been unable to find any decision by this court
construing and applying these provisions. In view of the
restrictive wording of the constitution and statute it would
seem to have been the intention to prohibit a referee going
into office or performing any function thereof until he has
taken the prescribed oath. Under section 104-2.7-6 a referee
is clothed with all the dignity, functions and powers of the
court. We question whether Mr. Dansie was ever in office
as referee, and if not, all his acts as such were void.
But, if he were ever in office, then all his acts and
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doings were void because of the form and manner in which
he attempted to perform his duties. Not that any possible
manner of performance could validate a void appointment
and order of reference,-nor a reference made in the absence of the indispensible prior decree to account creating
and imposing upon one party to the action the duty or
liability to account to the other party. But what did Mr.
Dansie do, upon the assumption that he was lawfully in
office?
And first, what should a referee do upon receiving a
va.Zid order of reference based upon a valid decree to
account? First, he should look to his jurisdiction by examining the record to see whether there were pleadings
defining an issue to be tried; i. e., an itemized account,
objections to items thereof, a counter-account. If not,
then look to the order of reference to see if he is authorized
to call upon the parties to so plead and define the issues to
be tried. If not, he should decline to act, and make return
accordingly on the order of reference to the court, or else
himself compel the parties to plead and produce an issue
for trial.
Assuming that proper issues are produced, affording
a basis for a trial, what should he then do? Code section
104-27-6 governs the procedure of a referee. It requires that
the referee must make an order fixing a time and place
for the trial before him to begin, and give each party ten
days' notice thereof. Then he must proceed to hear the
evidence of the parties within the issues, just as the court
itself would do if it had not appointed a referee. That is,
he must hear the testimony of witnesses upon direct and
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cross-examination. He is governed by the same rules of
evidence that govern the court in its reception of evidence
(Code sec. 104-54-5). He may issue subpoenas to require
witnesses to come before him and testify during his trial
of the case. At the conclusion of the trial he must make
written findings of fact and conclusions of law, just as
the court must do in trying a case. (Code sec. 104-27-6.)
And a bill of exceptions may be presented to, signed, settled
and filed by him, the same as the court may do if trying
the case. (Code sec. 104-39-8.)
Did the referee in this case, Mr. Dansie, do any of
these things? No. There were no issues of fact created
by any pleading or itemized statement of account filed
with the court or before the referee, or by any objections
thereto. He did not fix a time or place for trial, nor notify
the parties to attend. No witness testified under oath
before him ; no direct or cross-examination ; no evidence
was received by the referee in the presence of the parties
or their counsel. No rules of evidence were observed by
the referee in gathering his information. He gave the
parties no day in court so as to bind them by evidence
received or his rulings thereon. He proceeded exparte from
beginning to end. He gathered his evidence by private
inquiry orally or over the telephone, and out of the presence
of either of the parties, for the most part. He received and
treated as evidence books, records and documents gotten
somehow from somewhere, but not authenticated by the
oath of any witness as to the proper keeping thereof, or
the correctness of the contents thereof, or the entries
therein. In all that he did he betrayed no consciousness of
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his duties under the law, nor that he was expected to sit
judicially as a court and hear testimony under oath in the
presence of parties on both sides of the case.
If the referee did none of these things, then what did
he do? From the contents of his report, and his own
testimony in court in support thereof, upon his getting the
order of reference, he proceeded to-"an examination of existing books, documents
and papers submitted by the parties to this suit, and
has made considerable independent investigation to
establish facts not shown by such records." (Page
1 of his report filed Aug. 27, 1943.)
Whose books, and of what parties to the suit? He does
not name the parties who produced the books, nor indicate
the nature, contents or import thereof. Books of account,
no more than other private writings, do not prove themselves by their mere production. They require the authenticating oath of the persons who made the entries or kept
the books that they were correctly kept in the course of
duty, etc. Otherwise they are mere written hearsay.
This rule was recognized by this Court in the case of
Eureka Mining Co. v. Bullion Beck & Champion Mining
Co., 32 Utah 236; 90 Pac. 157, citing Healey v. WeUesley
& C. Ry. Co., 176 Mass. 440, 57 N. E. 703.
And where did the referee get his authority to consider
as evidence on the trial of what unknown issues, and out
of the presence of the parties or their counsel, the-"considerable independent investigation toestablish facts not shown by such records."?
The referee's report then proceeds to list a number
of schedules of receipts and disbursements, under different
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headings, designated Exhibits A, B and C, and Schedules
1 to 17 inclusive, attached to his report, and treats the
contents thereof as established facts for the purposes of
his report to the court. But where did he get his information to construct those exhibits and schedules, in the absence of any judicial trial by him in the presence of both
parties or their counsel? He does not say that he · got
the information from sworn testimony of witnesses, but
says he made considerable independent investigation to
establish facts not shown by the records. What facts did he
thus establish, and how do we know they were facts at all?
The parties are not bound by his private inquiry from
unsworn witness out of their presence and hearing.
His statement of the contents of accounts as constructed
in Exhibits A, B and C, are based upon hearsay testimony
and are binding upon no one. (Pages 1-3.)
On page 3, paragraph 3, his report states that:
"While it is recognized there may be expenditures related to the jobs in question which are not
reflected in this report, such omission, if it exists,
is due to a lack of any record or evidence of such expenditure coming to the attention of the referee."
Here is an admission that his report of expenditures
and disbursements, properly allowable, may be incomplete,
therefore unjust. But had the referee proceeded lawfully
to conduct a trial of appropriate issues of fact, after notice
to both parties of the time and place fixed for trial, and
in their presence, with the opportunity to both sides to
present witnesses, then the referee need not have concerned
himself with whether there were additional expenses pro-
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perly chargeable in account or not. The burden of producing witnesses being upon the parties concerned, a failure
or inability to prove all disbursements would be the bad
luck of the parties affected thereby. And his findings of
fact would bind and conclude the parties. Proceeding
privately, other than by a public trial, the statements of
account cooked up by the referee binds no one. It is hearsay
from beginning to end.
vVhen we designate Mr. Dansie as referee herein, it
will be understood to be out of courtesy and as if he had
been lawfully appointed and qualified.
These remarks apply also to the two items of $147.00
and $466.00 mentioned at the bottom of page 3 of his report.
The referee's disposition of those items binds no one.
On page 4 of his report the referee states that costs
on the jobs at Wendover do not lend themselves to easy
segregation and hence have been treated as a unit. The
"jobs at Wendover" refer to the three jobs at issue under
the complaint, viz.: The Harrison-Dorman job, the Hospital job and Railroad job. And no wonder they do not
lend themselves to easy segregation. They are the jobs in
respect of which the amended third defense and counterclaim charges the plaintiffs with recreancy in failing to
keep separate accounts to the detriment and injury of defendant, and downright misappropriation of part of his
$13,000.00 entrusted to plaintiffs to meet pay rolls. The
referee states that it would take considerable additional
time to try to make the segregation and unwarranted additional expense. We contend that plaintiffs were bound to
make the segregation and they could not discharge the
burden by getting such a report as this from the referee.
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The referee, on page 4 of his report, next takes up
the consideration of the "Hospital Job". This was one of
the jobs mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint and amended
complaint as the subject of the alleged partnership and of
the accounting they sought. It is also one of the subjects
of the defendant's recrimination in his third defense and
counter-claim. Although no finding of fact had been made
by the court, and no decree to account, with respect to that
job or any other, yet it was included in the void order of
reference, and the referee got into operation with respect
to that job and others. On page 4 of his report the referee
begins his mention of this job as included within schedule
7 of his report. He there states that the report (meaning
the information on which schedule 7 was constructed)-"was received from Lt. Col. G. A. Howarth,
area engineer for the U. S. Government at Wendover,
upon request of the undersigned made through Mr.
Newman.
"In another letter from Col. Howarth, advice is
given that the total yardage of the hospital job, exclusive of miscellaneous work done under that contract number, is 72,676.05 cubic yards. The hospital
job is reported as officially completed under date of
September 30, 1942.
"Request has been made of Mr. Newman's office
to furnish information from the U. S. area engineer,
and from their own records, giving details as to the
placement of the yardage represented by the difference between 59,492 yards and 72,676.05 yards. Up
to the date of the preparation of this report the additional information has not been received."
We here interrupt the quotation to point out that the
quoted statements disclose that the referee was engaged in
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the illegal and unauthorized course of assembling his information on which to base a report to the court by means
of private inquiry from unsworn witnesses, by correspondence with other unsworn persons, and by unwarranted
inferences drawn from his failure to get complete cooperation from other persons, instead of conducting a public
trial in the presence of counsel for both sides. In such
a trial the responsibility for assembling their witnesses
and producing complete and adequate proofs would have
been upon counsel for the respective parties, aided by
subpoenas if necessary. And in case of their inability to
obtain complete proofs, the misfortune would fall upon
themselves, not upon the referee. And the decision of the
referee upon all the evidence produced would have been
binding on both sides, and equally so whether the proofs
were lacking as where they were ample and abundant.
The report of the referee based upon private inquiry out of
the presence of the parties serves to show not only its
illegality but its unserviceability as a report because of
its incompleteness and its reliance upon unsworn statements obtained out of the presence of the parties.
Returning now to quote from the report (bottom of
page 4) it recites :
"There is a difference of opinion between the
parties involved in this case as to the price per cubic
yard at which the revenue from the hospital job
should be computed."
Why did not the referee decide this difference of opinion
upon a vital point in his report to the court. The price per
cubic yard was an indispensible factor in the accounting
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process (if lawfully undertaken and executed). If the ref"eree had conducted a public trial instead of a private parley,
he would have had judicial authority to settle the dispute
by listening to sworn testimony on the subject and by making a finding of fact thereon. His failure to do so condemns
his method of disposing of the issue by non-judicial inquiry.
But his report proceeds to say :
"The original contract called for 100,000 cubic
yards at a price of 59 cents per yard. Under date of
Sept. 6, 1942, a change order relating to this contract was initiated, and final approval was given in
December, 1942, changing the terms of the contract
to 100,000 cubic yards at a price of 69 cents. The
change order in itself does not give any particular
explanation for the change made.
"Without presuming to express any opinion as
to the legal implications of the change order in question, the undersigned has used a price of 69' cents
upon the assumption the change order relates to the
contract as a whole."
Again we inquire, how did the referee know that the
contract on this hospital job between defendant Newman
and the U. S. Army Engineers. called for 100,000 cubic
yards at a price of 59 cents per yard. Assuming that he
saw some sort of a paper specifying those terms, did the
document prove itself, its authenticity, its signature by adequate authority and by defendant ?-without the sworn
testimony of any witness authenticating the same? And the
same criticism applies to the so-called change order. Who
issued it, and by what authority. And by what authority did
the referee accept the change order raising the price ten
cents a yard, as operating to the advantage of the plaintiffs
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in this action by crediting them therewith in the accounting
he was trying to make?
Doubt is cast upon this matter also by the fact that the
order appointing the referee (Rec. p. 74-76) contained a
provision limiting the authority of the referee to inquire
into the hospital job "only as to Sept. 3, 1942" (Rec. p. 75,
5th line from bottom), and not beyond that date.
But the referee not only presumed without authority
to go beyond that date in his inquiry, but avoided "presuming
to express any opinion as to the legal implications" of what
he found out by such transgression of authority, viz.: the
legal implications of the change order. If he had been trying the case judicially as a referee of the court as code 10427-6 intends, and had he been guided by the ordinary rules
of evidence in a court trial, as code 104-54-5 intends, he need
not have felt it to be a presumption on his part to express
his opinion on the subject by means of a finding of fact and
a conclusion of law, that would have bound and concluded
both parties, save on review by the court. As it is, the defendant is not bound by the referee's unauthorized presumption, his neglect to presume, or by his giving the plaintiffs
the benefit of the doubt in his own mind arising from no legal
evidence, and to the extent of an unauthorized debit against
Mr. Newman of ten cents a yard on 72,676.05 cubic yards, or
$7,267.60.
Returning to the referee's report, on page 5 thereof,
mention is made of an unsettled balance claimed by one
R. M. Birdzell of Wendover, Utah, for sand, gravel and filldirt hauled by him on the Harrison and Dorman job. This
job is also one of the three mentioned in the pleadings on
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both sides as the subject of an attempted accounting by each
against the other. Concerning this item the report recites
that:
"Investigation concerning this claim has developed the fact that a controversy exists with respect to whether or not this amount is owing by
Newman, Huber and Dunkley. Due to the fact that
the amount has never been paid and that there is a
difference of opinion as to whether or not it is due,
no effect has been given to same in this report. If it
develops that such amount, or any portion of it, is
owing then it should be charged one-third to Newman
and two-thirds to Huber and Dunkley to maintain
the proper relationship of the parties as set forth in
this report."
The same objections lie to this part of the referee's report as to tbise before discussed. Assuming the referee had
lawful authority to make any investigati~n at all of the
accounts, which the record contradicts'; yet in order to properly discharge the duties of a referee under the code, he
would have to conduct a public trial upon sworn testimony
in open court in the presence of opposing counsel. Had he
done that, it would have been his duty to decide the controversy between the parties before him as to whether the
Birdzell item was owing and chargeable in account or not.
The fact that a controversy existed disclosed that one side
(most likely Newman) was contending it to be a just claim,
at least in part; while the plaintiffs Dunkley and Huber
were disputing it. The same fact made it the duty of the
referee to decide the controversy, instead of passing it up,
and to include it, so far as allowed, in the accounting he was
proposing to make. If such a decision required Birdzell to
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be brought before the court as a party, that might be done
under equitable procedure by a petition naming Birdzell
as a defendant, requiring him to plead and set up his claim.
But again the referee gave plaintiffs the benefit of the
doubt remaining from an undecided controversy, and rejected the Birdzell claim entirely. The result is, if Birdzell
should elect to sue Newman (sole sub-contractor in the
Harrison-Dorman contract and the only party recognized
by Harrison-Dorman or by R. M. Birdzell), who is amply
solvent and able to respond; and should he get judgment and
it be paid by Newman, then he might try his luck in trying
to collect back two-thirds of it from Huber and Dunkley
who, it appears by this record, have had only one truck apiece
employed in all these jobs, and that one truck each would
be exempt.
We need hardly pause to cite law to the point that,
assuming there was a partnership between plaintiffs and
defendant on this Harrison-Dorman job, and so found by
the court, and an accounting thereof decreed, so as to bring
the question before the referee, it would be his duty to see
that all claims of creditors of the firm were brought in, their
claims allowed or rejected, and a balance struck, before proceeding to a proposed division of the net assets.

"The interest of a partner in the firm assets is
the share to which he is entitled under the partnership agreement, after claims against the firm
are satisfied and the equities and accounts as between the parties adjusted, and has been so defined
in a number of statutes."
47 Corp. Jur., p. 780, Partnership, sec. 221, note
99, citing cases in foot note from nearly all
.the states;
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Utah Annot. Code, 69-l-351 t;)-1-!- :·! ·
"As otherwise stated, the rule is that partners
do not, as individuals, own the firm property, but
that it is held by and belongs to the partnership, as
such, subject to the right of the partners to have it
applied to the payment of firm debts. * * * The
interest has been said to be a mere chose in action."
47 Corp. Jur., p. 781, sec. 221, notes 3 and 6 et
cit., and see 47 Corp. Jur., p. 911, sec. 401.
The referee's report proposed to ignore this rule of law
and, as appears later, the trial court ratified it and gave
judgment accordingly.
There is a further item, closing the referee's report,
beginning at the bottom of page 5 of his report, which recites that:
"The final matter relates to information given
by Mr. Bradshaw Harrison of the firm of Harrison
and Dorman. Mr. Harrison stated to the undersigned
that under date of April 28, 1943, his firm had made
a demand upon Victor Newman for the payment of
$7,579.64 in connection with their contract with
N ewma.n. It was explained that this amount represented a settlement with Curtis Sand and Gravel
Company of the excess cost in having Curtis complete Newman's. contract with 'them.
"No effect has been given to this item in this
report, and if this amount, or any part of it, is determined to be due to Harrison and Dorman, it should
be charged one-third to Newman and two-thirds to
Huber and Dunkley."
What we have just said regarding the R. M. Birdzell
item applies in full force to the disposition made by the referee of this balance claimed by the Harrison-Dorman Com-
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pany. If it is a just claim it should have been brought into
the calculation of accounts between Huber and Dunkley on
the one hand and Nev.:man on the other. And that would be
on the assun1ption that the district court had, in the first
instance, in its trial of that issue, both found and decreed
that a partnership exists between these parties, and ordered
Newman to account to Huber and Dunkley. Otherwise, there
was no jurisdiction to take an account or refer the matter
at all. Ho,vever, could all this be gotten around, then the
referee should have conducted a judicial trial of issues
formed by adequate accounts filed, with objections thereto,
pointing out the items in dispute. Without any such issue
formed by verified accounts or other pleadings defining
issues, the referee proceeded to a private inquiry. And
when confronted by a dispute, he passed it up, and gave the
benefit of contested items to the plaintiffs. If the Harrisonnorman claim for $7,579.64 for excess cost of having the
Newman undertaking completed by the Curtis Sand &
Gravel Company, is a valid one, it is just as much a firm
liability as was the R. M. Birdzell claim of $2,632.45. Dunkley and Huber, assuming they sucessfully maintain their
claim to a two-thirds interest in this Harrison-Dorman
job as partners of Newman, would have to await payment
and satisfaction of both claims against their firm, before
asking division and distribution of the cash balance of
firrp assets. The referee declined to pass upon it as valid
or not, but bunched the two claims together and allowed
the plaintiffs two-thirds of the whole, ($10,212.49) which
is $6,808.06 as a present in his accounting, without deciding
their right to it.
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The Referee's Testimony
We have now finished with the recitals in the referee's
report, and we take up his testimony on the witness stand,
y;jp__(..-~/
to further elucidate it. ~ the report was filed, the case
was brought on for another hearing before the court.
Whereupon Mr. Dansie was requested to take the stand,
and he was interrogated by plaintiffs' counsel. The chief
purpose of this questioning seems to have been to lay a
foundation for impeaching the referee's report, insofar as
it made an allowance of $41,049.48 receipts from the Hospital job based upon a yardage haul of 59,492 cubic yards
between August 11th and September 3rd, 1942. (See
Schedule 7, record page 463 of the report.)
We pause here to say that it is not the writer's intention to go extensively into the figures arrived at by the
referee in the schedules of his report. That would only
be appropriate if we had here a valid referee's report,
rather than a complete nullity based upon hearsay obtained
by private inquiry, without issues, legal evidence, or findings thereon as required by law. But in order to point an
inquiry subsequently arising before the court, we do digress
here long enough to notice one circumstance relating to
the figures accepted by the referee, in connection with his
testimony.
His report stated (pages 4-5) that the original contract on this job was for 100,000 cubic yards at 59 cents
a cubic yeard (referring to Newman's contract with the
U.S. Army Engineers.) He based this on a letter of May 7,
1943, from Col. Howarth (marked Exhibit F in the exhibit
envelope), stating that only 59,492 cubic yards had been
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hauled up to September 3, 1942 (when plaintiffs right, if
any, ended, according to the trial court's rulings and order
of reference).
Now 59,492 cubic yards at 59 cents yields only $35,100.28. But the referee, in schedule 7 of his report, upped
this amount to $41,049.48, or a difference of $5,949.20, by
adding ten cents to the contract price of 59 cents per yard.
Why? Because he had gotten sight of a change order
(unproved) raising the contract price to 69 cents per yard,
dated September 6, 1942. That is, the referee just assumed
that this "change order" had an ex post facto operation;
and so he carried it back and applied it to the haulage
already delivered before the change order was made and
before September 3, 1942. And this although it was made
to appear elsewhere in the record that the change order
was not approved by the army authorities until December,
1942 (Rec. p. 378). Thereby the referee added two-thirds
of this $5,949.20 raise, or $3,955.27 to plaintiffs' "take,"
otherwise proposed in his report.
But plaintiffs' counsel was not satisfied with this velvet.
He wanted also a slice out of defendant's haulage on this
Hospital job after September 3, 1942, which was after they
had ceased to have any interest in it (assuming that they
ever had an interest), by their own testimony, and by the
trial court rulings prior to the reference, also incorporated
in the order of reference. To implement his efforts in this
respect, he at once began to term the letter of Col. Howarth
(exhibit F in exhibit envelope) hearsay (Rec. 312). And
he followed this up from time to time until he finally got
the trial court to rule that it was hearsay, and to exclude
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it as such (Rec. pp. 347, 391-2), although that letter was
one of the props on which the referee's report rested, which
report plaintiffs' counsel had procured to be made, vouched
for it, and offered it in evidence (Rec. p. 316-7). And as
if the referee's report itself were not made up of hearsay
from beginning to end. That is, hearsay because its verity
rested on what sundry persons had told the referee, not
under oath, but out of the presence of the parties and their
counsel.
We refrain from further comment here on the pursuit
by plaintiffs' counsel of additional perquisites from the
Hospital job to which his industry would lead us. It may
recur later in connection with the trial court's rulings and
findings. For the present we stick to the referee's report
and the manner of its preparation as disclosed by the
referee's own testimony. The fact that he constantly pursued the plan of private inquiry from unsworn persons
out of the presence of defendant and his counsel, is disclosed on nearly every page of his testimony. (See Rec. pp.
311-7, 330-7, 345, 351-2, 376-380, 384-390.) Further, his
testimony shows that he ran around the streets and to
different places in company with plaintiffs' counsel, Mr.
Callister, making these private inquiries, out of the presence of defendant or his counsel, showing that Mr. Callister
condoned and participated in this method of making a
judicial inquiry. (Rec. pp. 330, 335, 351, 384.) Both
Mr. Callister and Mr. Dansie openly admitted this in open
court session. (Rec. pp. 330, 335, 351, 384.)
As regards the books and records that Mr. Dansie
"audited" and condensed their unsworn contents into his
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report, it is doubtful upon his testimony in open court
whether in fact he ever saw any of the defendant Newman's
books and records, that were kept and the entries therein
made by Newman's authority. There was an effort made
by his questioner to convey the impression that he had
seen Mr. Newman's books. But his later statements throw
doubt upon it, and the books spoken of may have been and
likely were, only the self-serving compilations of the plaintiffs themselves. It must be noted that the plaintiff Dunkley, in testifying sought to convey the impression that the
books he kept were kept for the partnership claimed to
consist of himself, Huber and Newman. And Newman
claimed that the records that Dunkley kept at Wendover as
his employee, were all mixed up and confused, and that no
accounting had been made to him by Dunkley. Hence Newman may never have received or seen these books or records,
or loose memoranda, whatever they were. They were certainly no part of Newman's regular books of account kept
for him by his own regular bookkeeper, Mr. William Bacon.
With this background of conditions in mind, we may be
better able to appraise some of the questions thrown at
Mr. Dansie by plaintiff's counsel on this subject.
"Q. Now, Mr. Dansie, there was submitted to
you, was there not, all the books and records of the
enterprise known as Huber and Dunkley and Newman enterprises on ·the Hospital Job, Ft. Douglas
Job and various other jobs as submitted in that order
of court appointing you, were they not?
"A. As far as I know."
"Q.

"A.

You asked for their books, did you not?
Yes sir."
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Now who was it that submitted these undescribet
books to the referee, claimed by the questioner to be tht
books of the enterprises in question? The witness himse}j
had no authority or privilege in law to draw his own con.
elusions as to whose books they were, who had kept them,
or whether they belonged to an enterprise owned by Huber,
Dunkley and Newman. That would be for the court or
referee when authentic sworn testimony should be produced. If they were submitted to Mr. Dansie by Dunkley or
Huber only, it can not be said that Newman was bound to
any admission as to the verity of the contents thereof of
whatever nature, or that he vouched for their accuracy.
Aside from that, how could Mr. Dansie have known whether
the books shown him were all the books and records or not.
Furthermore they were affected by the considerations next
below mentioned.
At record page 349, Dunkley while on the witness
stand produced a book containing a record which he claimed
to have made and kept as timekeeper on this hospital job
from its beginning on August 11, 1942, until September 3,
1942, when he ceased to keep it. This, and other books or
papers in his own possession, but so far as appears never
seen by Newman, may have been the books of the enterprises in question to which the questions of counsel above
quoted referred. But the record and Dunkley's own testimony show that he had even then begun to claim adversely
to his principal's rights and interests, claiming to be a
partner, a claim then unknown to Newman. In view of
which no book entries that he could make or devise could
be used as evidence in his own favor against his principal.
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From the moment a fiduciary sets up an interest or claim
adversely to his correlate, his representative character is
destroyed, and nothing that he can do, or say, or write in
a book in his own favor or interest can bind his principal,
or correlate.
This applies also to another book mentioned by Dunkley
at record page 353, as kept by himself on the railroad job,
but the contents of which he gives no information. Returning now to the questions asked by counsel, viz. :
"Q. Now Mr. Dansie, you have had delivered to
you all the books, records and documents pertaining
to the Wendover job of the Huber-Dunkley-Newman
enterprise, have you not?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you have examined those books, documents and papers?
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Have you 'been able to ascertain from those
books, documents and papers any expenditures on the
Wendover job after Sept. 3rd, 1942?
"A. There were some expenditures made after
that, which are included in my report, relating to the
work done prior to Sept. 4th.

* * * *
"Q. Did you find in those papers, books and
records any expenditures on the hospital fill job, subsequent to Sept. 4th, 1942?
"A. No, sir." (Rec. p. 388.)

Bearing in mind that the trial court had on April 6th
trial in this case ruled from the bench (see ante pp. 51-52)
that the supposed joint venture had come to an end on
September 3, 1942, it is easy enough to see that the books
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referred to above were those constructed by Dunkley, either
before or after he left Newman's service. As such they
naturally would not contain any record of Newman's expenditures on the job after Dunkley ceased to keep the
records for Newman. After Newman took over on Septemper 4th he saw to it that adequate records were kept
by his own loyal employees and bookkeepers, not by one
who had already become his adversary in thought, act and
intent. Although Dunkley remained on the job in some
capacity for two or two and a half weeks after September
3rd, 1942, his duties with respect to the keeping of books
or records on the hospital job must have ceased at that
time. This, not only as a natural inference from Dansie's
finding no entries in the books Dunkley kept, later than
September 3, 1942, but also from the testimony of Newman regarding the messed up, mixed up, conditions of the
Dunkley books and records on the jobs and his great dissatisfaction therewith (ante pp. 41-44). See also the charges
made in this respect in Newman's counter-claims in this
case (Appendix post pp.125-7, 129-130). So that the failure of
the Dunkley books, kept by him before he was "fired" as
bookkeeper or timekeeper on the job, to show expenditures
by Newman thereafter would not be at all surprising, and
proves nothing as to what was in fact done by Newman
thereafter on the hospital job. The questions and answers
quoted are only noteworthy for the subtle way in which
it was sought to confuse and mislead. It certainly cannot
be said therefrom that Mr. Dansie ever saw any of Mr.
Newman's own books and records that were kept by his
own loyal employees, faithful to his interests, or by which
he would be in any way bound or concluded.
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If :Mr. Dansie had asked Newman for his own books and
records on this job from and after September 3rd, 1942, to
supplement those kept by Dunkley, and if Newman stood
upon his rights, he never would have opened any of them
to aid Dansie in the sort of unjudicial, private, one-sided
and unsworn investigation he was engaged in conducting.
And it is fairly inferable that that is just what Newman
did refuse to do, in view of the constant complaint running
all through the questioning of Mr. Dansie upon the witness
stand and the answers evoked thereby, that Mr. Newman
or his representatives refused to give certain information
asked for by the referee; that the latter's repeated requests
remained uncomplied with ; so that he had to close his report
without benefit of the information they might have given
him. See Record pages 314-5, 345-6, 352. Had Mr. Dansie
pursued the statutory method of conducting a public trial
of issues framed to delimit the proofs, in the presence of
both parties and their counsel, Mr. Newman might have
been found more cooperative.
In all the reported cases heretofore reaching this court
involving a reference to take testimony and report, the
published opinions of this court show that the referee
followed the statute, conducted a public trial with witnesses
sworn and testifying openly in the presence of the parties
and their counsel ; that the evidence was preserved by the
referee and reported back to the court with his own written
findings of fact, conclusions and recommendations for a
decree. That thereafter the parties filed with the trial
court such objections and exceptions as they desired, hearing was had thereon, and the court ruled thereon and
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either adopted or modified or rejected the referee's fin(
ings and settled its own findings accordingly. Why woul
that not have been a good way for this referee to hav
followed? We cite:

Hanks v. Matthews, 8 Utah 181, 30 Pac. 504;
Hanson, In re, 48 Utah 163, 158 P.ac. 778;
Eureka Mining Co. v. Bullion Beck, etc. M~"n. Co.
32 Utah 236, 90 Pac .. 157;
Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, etc. Co., 14 Utah 339
47 Pac. 311;
Reev·er v. White, 8 Utah 188, 30 Pac. 685.
The referee's report was utterly void and binds no one
In historic phrase it was "a mere scrap of paper." 11
cannot serve to enlighten the court either as evidence o1
a testifying witness or as an official return of the referee
to the court's void order of reference. It is addressed as
a private letter to the trial judge, thus: "Dear Sir," etc.
Besides, the court was itself acting without jurisdic·
tion in the absence of written pleadings and a defined issue
limiting proofs; that is, it was conducting no lawful trial,
was authorized to make no judicial inquiry; and not even
sworn testimony on the witness stand could rescue the proceedings from utter invalidity and illegality. Certainly the
private letter from the referee could not.
Let us now see what the trial court did attempt to do
about it.
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THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT
In all that we have said hereinbefore, we have taken
the position that the trial court never did make any findings
of fact, conclusions of law, or decree establishing the existence of a partnership relation between plaintiffs and defendant, a breach of duty by defendant growing out of that
relationship, and a liability to account therefor, nor decree
that defendant proceed to account, before it proceeded to the
accounting itself; that is, to a determination of the items
of debits and credits that would, when properly itemized,
classified and tabulated, show a net balance that belonged
to the parties, and the proportionate share thereof belonging to each party. That position is still true, as we approach
the conclusion of the trial and of this brief. The trial court
proceeded to an accounting between the parties, in irregular
fashion, without first finding as facts, drawing conclusions,
and decreeing that defendant owed the plaintiffs any duty to
account. And it decreed a state of affairs to exist, (without
evidential support) from which it drew the conclusion that
defendant ought to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $19,451.03,
and entered a decree accordingly. Thus exceeding its jurisdiction, under the decision of this Court in the Rozelle case
(ante p. 14).
Now it does not heal this jurisdictional deficit for the
trial court to have inserted in its findings of fact which
consummated the attempted accounting without jurisdiction,
certain provisions purporting to determine relationship
between the parties which would have been appropriate in
a preliminary trial and decision of those matters with decree to correspond, prior to undertaking the accounting
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process. In this final decree in accounting which the com
did enter, or just prior thereto, the trial court did make som
findings of fact, incomplete and insufficient, but still find
ings that bear a certain resemblance or comparison to find
ings of fact the court might have made at the close of th
preliminary trial April 6th, 1943. They were filed too lat1
to afford any support to the accounting that was attempte1
on June 3rd-4th, 1943. Appropriate findings at the firs1
trial must have preceded the final trial to give any validit~
to the latter. And defendant had the right to test the validi~
and sufficiency of the former by an appeal to the SupremE
Court before being forced into an accounting against hh
will. It was .too late to acquire jurisdiction after the non·
jurisdictional trial had been completed.
Perhaps we might dismiss this matter of the finding~
that were belatedly made on this subject of relationship of
the parties and liability to account, with the foregoing remarks. But should opposing counsel by any ingenuity of
strategy seek to build a case thereon, we might point out
some of its deficiencies to meet the issues in the pleadings1
notwithstanding they were late and unprofitable in any
event.
Part of paragraph 1 of these findings (Rec. 83-84; post
pp. 130-140) were responsive to the averments in paragraphs
1, 2 and 4 of the amended complaint (Rec. 13-14, appendix
post pp. 116-7), but not completely so. It was not responsive
but repugnant to the evidence on the same subject. It contradicted the plaintiff Dunkley's own testimony that there was
no general and over-all agreement for a partnership covering all jobs taken in the intermountain area, as alleged; but
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that there were separate agreements or undertakings upon
each job in turn, as it came up, embracing only that job and
no other (ante p. 26). This was decisive, because in the
absence of any such general and over-all agreement embracing and comprising all jobs taken within its operation, and
still in existence when the three jobs in the pleadings came
up and were undertaken, there was no basis whatever for
the contention insistently made and pressed by plaintiffs
counsel, that the defendant breached this general and over-all
agreement of partnership or joint ventures by excluding
plaintiffs from the benefit thereof in respect of, for instance,
the hospital job. When that job came up, if Newman did
not see fit to take plaintiffs in on it with himself, either as
profit sharers, or in any other way, that was his privilege.
Assuming, of course that he had not bound himself by any
obligation to do so, based upon a quid pro quo or consideration paid, from which he could not withdraw himself. And
plaintiff Dunkley swears that he and they did not. All the
service they did for Newman after August 11th was under
defendant's offer to let them remain, if they chose, at $100 a
week. And that was terminated when they ceased to work
and went away,-Huber on September 1st, or thereabouts,
and Dunkley about two weeks later.
Newman testified that he gave plaintiffs notice on the
very day he took the contract on the hospital job from the
U.S. Army engineers, that they were not to share profits on
that job (ante pp. 41-44). We find no contradiction of this in
the record anywhere. But if there were a conflict of evidence
on the point, it enters directly into the question of joint
relations on the job, and plaintiffs who contend for it should
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have procured a court finding of fact to settle the question:
before coveting an accounting or sharing of the profits.
They cannot go on getting $100 a week as wages, then turn
and claim a share of the profits in addition.
Pararaph 1 of the court's belated findings is, deficient
in this respect, in that it contains no statement of duration
of the claimed joint ventures agreement, if any, or that it
was in force and bound the defendant at the time he accepted
the jobs in dispute here. The Harrison-Dorman job only
and alone could be said to have been a joint job when taken
(not by any general over-all agreement but by special agreement when that job was taken); and that job lost money,
under the· undisputed evidence, and so Newman owed them
nothing on that job.
With respect to the belated finding paragraph 1, in its
relation to the issues in the pleadings, there were averments
in the counterclaims that plaintiffs were defendant's trusted
employees performing personal services for him for a compensation or reward in respect of these jobs. And there was
evidence to sustain these averments, the agreed compensation
or reward being a share of the net profits in lieu of a stated
salary. This constituted employee relationship notwithstanding the profit sharing provision (see ante p. 28). This
certainly called for a s.pecific finding of fact whenever the
cour-t felt an impulse to make findings in the case. The
findings made were too late to do any good, but if and when
made, should be complete and meet every issue in the pleadings, both affirmative and negative (ante p. 19).
The finding, within paragraph 1 thereof, that plaintiffs
and defendant entered into a.· joint venture on the Stearns-
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togers job, Harrison-Dorman job, Geer job, Fort Douglas
ob, Railroad job and Hospital job and accepted and did the
vork on all these jobs under a.n oral agreement comprising
hem all, is absolutely unsupported by any evidence in the
·ecord or by any witness for either side, but is contrary
;hereto (ante p. 26). Plaintiff Dunkley himself disputes

t specifically, while Huber never testified at all. Not even
;he complaint claims that the Stearns-Rogers job, the Geer
iob, or the ·Fort Douglas job were embraced within the
Llleged partnership agreement (Appendix post pp. 116-9).
Going now, away from the amended complaint and
;he issues made thereon, we find numerous affirmative
1verments of material facts, in the defendant's amended
mswer and counterclaim (Rec. pp. 51, 59; Appendix post
)p. 120-131), calling for findings of fact in respons'e to each
ssue tendered. Upon the decisions of these issues by the
~ourt would turn its decision as to whether plaintiffs owed
;he defendant the duty of accounting, in the first instance,
:or a violation of their duties as trusted employees, handling
md disbursing his funds to the amount of $13,000, or therelbouts, deposited to their credit in a bank .to permit them
;o meet his pay rolls during his absence upon other jobs.
:\nd their alleged violation of the duty to be loyal to his
.nterests, that is, undertake no jobs on the side in their own
1ame and interest while financing their payroll out of de:endant's funds deposited in trust in their bank account, yet
~ollecting the proceeds for their own use, and making no
tccounting thereof to defendant. And their alleged violation
>f their duty to be competent and able to perform the duties
~hich they undertook to perform on several jobs which lost
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money to defendant because of their neglect, misconduct an(
dereliction of duty. And their duty to be faithful in thl
keeping and rendering of their accounts to defendant upor
each of his jobs separately, on which they were employed
and their failure so to do, to his great loss and damage
There was evidence upon which specific findings of fac1
could have been made by the trial court on each issue separately as contained and alleged in these several pages and
paragraphs of the amended answer and counterclaims. For
the issues governed the question of whether the plaintiffs
had breached their duties to the defendant in these several
respects and particulars, upon the decision of which by the
court, by apt findings responsive to the issues, it should
have ordered the plaintiffs. to account to the defendant,
before becoming entitled to an accounting from him in any
event. These were material and indispensible issues; and
it was the court's duty to make specific findings upon each
issue and to enter a dcree to account in conformity thereto.
But it should have done this two months prior, and before
it occupied its time with any accounting.
The trial court did not make any such findings either
at the conclusion of the preliminary trial in April, 1942, nor
in its set of belated findings made after the attempted
accounting in excess of jurisdiction.
Going now to paragraph 2 of the belated findings of
fact (Rec. p. 84, post p. 140) it states that the referee her~
tofore has made his report and accounting, which the court
has adopted in part and modified in part. We have shown
herein that the referee's report was such in name only,
and not one in fact or law. The Court also finds that there
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was a joint venture in respect of the hospital job as of, to,
and including September 3rd, 1942. This is unsupported by
evidence \Vhich shows that no joint venture on this job was
ever undertaken by defendant with plaintiffs in the first
instance, but explicit notice to the contrary was given by
defendant to plaintiffs on the very day the contract for that
job was obtained (ante pp. 41-44). But if there was any basis
for a contrary finding, it should have been made and filed
by the trial court in April, 1943, and before the accounting
process was entered upon.
Finding 3 is a mere conclusion of law upon unstated
facts and amounts to nothing.
Paragraph 4 of the findings is unsupported by evidence,
in that Plaintiff Dunkley testified that there was no general
agreement for any duration covering all jobs; that their
arrangements began and terminated with each job separately
and never comprehended more than one job, as each job
in its turn arose and was finished (ante p. 26). Anyway
it is belated and void.
Paragraph 5 states that Dansie was appointed referee
and has made his report which the court adopts, in which
receipts and disbursements are listed, and which are copied
literally from the report into the court's findings. There
.are several pages of these figures listed as Exhibit A, Exhibit Band Exhibit C in the report and in the finding. The
balance struck against defendant Newman in favor of plaintiffs Huber and Dunkley by Exhibits B and C thereof, is
$13,386.37. (See appendix post pp. 143-6.) In adopting the
report the court adopted a nullity and the finding gained
naught thereby.
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A further feature of Exhibits A, B and C of the report,
carried into the finding, is that of the bunching of the accounts on the Harrison-Dorman job, the Geer job, the railroad job and the hospital job into one consolidated statement
of account. The receipts on these jobs are listed as separate
items and added up, but the disbursements are mixed together indiscriminately, so that no one can tell how much
was disbursed on each job separately. As the referee was
dependent on the information, books and payrolls kept by
the plaintiffs, which the referee found in great confusion,
it is understandable how they could not be separated by an
expert accountant. The referee reports that "these jobs do
not lend themselves to easy segregation" and so he "treats
them as a unit." No wonder. That is why they got into
hot water with Newman and he fired them when he could
stand it no longer. See complaints in his counter-claims.
Furthermore, there was no legal excuse for his going into
the Geer job or the Stearns-Rogers job, for they were not
embraced in either the complaint or counter-claims. Howbeit,
if they had been so included and the reference lawfully
made and conducted, it would have been to the defendant's
advantage, because plaintiffs got away with a lot of defendant's money to meet the pay rolls on both those jobs, and
kept the income therefrom without an accounting.
But the trouble with all this "crap" in the referee's
report is that it is purely hearsay, not built upon sworn
testimony or authentic books of record; from material assembled somehow by private inquiry and exparte cooperation
with plaintiffs' attorney out of the presence or knowledge
of the defendant, and none of it has any value whatever
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as evidence or otherwise, on which the court below could
lawfully act. It had no right to take any notice thereof. Its
finding based thereon falls to the ground like an empty sack,
for it has nothing to support it. And to cap it all, the court
was proceeding without jurisdiction and not even valid
sworn testimony could avail it anything. Coram non judice
can properly be written across every page of the court's
proceedings on June 3rd and 4th, 1943.
Paragraph 6 of the findings can be summarily disposed
of in the same way, wherein it is recited that 72,676.05
cubic feet of material was delivered on the hospital job
under defendant Newman's contract with the government.
The only support for this is Mr. Dansie's void report coupled
with two letters from the U. S. Army Engineers marked
Exhibit F (see exhibit envelope), which plaintiffs counsel
objected to and caused to be excluded by the court as
hearsay. Thereby kicking the only props from under the
report which plaintiffs had offered in evidence as Exhibit
F (Rec. p. 316) ,-assuming that one hearsay document
can support another or give evidential value to either of
them.
We have considered this feature to some extent in our
discussion of the Dansie report itself (ante pp. 62-67, 76-98),
and need not repeat. Plaintiffs' counsel strove vainly to supplement these void documents on the witness stand, and the
proceedings in the bill of exceptions from record page 310
onward is the story of his flounderings. No witness could
be produced to substitute for the excluded hearsay letters
of Col. Howarth (Exhibit F). At length, in apparent
desperation, counsel put his client Dunkley back on the
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witness stand again, after frequent trips before) and in
answer to questions Mr. Dunkley stated:
"I acted as bookkeeper on the hospital fill job.
I kept a day-by-day record of the cubic yards put on
that fill. From Aug. 11th, which was the first day
dirt was hauled up there to Aug. 25th there was no
actual yardage record kept because when the job
started Mr. Howe, the resident engineer, gave Mr.
Huber and myself the impression that they were
going to measure it by barrow-pit measurement.
Therefore no load tickets were given out on the actual
yardage hauled there. (Witness thereupon gives the
daily number of loads between those dates, which
foot up a total of 7,326, loads.) (Rec. 339.)
"I haven't any yardage on the loads that were
hauled down to Aug. 25th. Each load did not have
the same amount in it. Every truck hauling may be
different or may be the s'ame. Up to Aug. 25th there
were no trucks that were measured even. They were
working by the hour and they hauled what was put in
them. (Rec. 343-4.)
"From Aug. 25th to Sept. 3rd the truck loads
were measured and load tickets given, and my record
is made from the tickets turned in by the truck drivers, and are correct. (Witness gives the daily haulage in cubic yards from Aug. 25th to Sept. 3rd from
his book recrd, which foots. up a total of 26,77 4 cubic
yards.) (Rec. p. 340.)
"The figures given in Exhibit F (viz.: the letter
of Col. Howarth to Newman) can only be an estimate,
because no tickets were given out on the cubic yard
basis. They commenced to measure the pit starting
Aug. 25th. (Rec. 341.)
"MR. CALLISTER: This letter (Howarth's
letter Exhibit F) in my judgment is pure hearsay,
and I am going to introduce it for that purpose. Mr.
Newman is the only one who can get the informa-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

109
tion from Col. Howarth. And I would ask, if they
don't believe Mr. Dunkley here, let us have Col.
Howarth, or let Mr. Newman bring in the evidence
to show that we are wrong. Mr. Dansie asked for
that information and it hasn't been forthcoming.
(Rec. 344.)
"MR. MORRISSEY: If it is possible to subpoena the man who sent us that letter we will bring
him down. (Rec. 345.)
"MR. CALLISTER: We will take Mr. Howart or anybody that will give us the figures. I can't
get them. (Rec. 346.)
"THE COURT: I don't think there is any question about it this letter is hearsay. If your witness
is the only witness there is here I am very apt to
believe your witness. If there is any other evidence
they produce that I think better I might believe that.
But unless there is, I wouldn't worry so much.
"MR. CALLISTER: Thank you.
"Q. Will you please total up the amount of
cubic yards as shown by your records you have
testified to, from Aug. 11th to Sept. 3rd inclusive,
as to the amount of cubic yards that was hauled
which was hauled on this job?
"A. They are not totalled up in this book and
naturally I can't add them up. But I incorporated
in this book-at least I don't see it anywhere,-the
total yardage that was hauled from Aug. 11th, to
Sept. 3rd,-all of those figures add up to 71,000
cubic yards." (Rec. 347.)
NOTE: Comparing the last statement <;>f ~h~ witne~s in this
(luotation with these that preceded It, It IS mamfest that
he has no book record of the yardage hauled from Aug.
11th to 25th 1942, on the hospital job; else he would
not have ma'de the statements he did taken from Rec.
pp. 339 to 343. His neglect to keep the y~rdage reco:d,
thereby throwing his employer's accounts mto confusiOn
with the Government's army engineers, was one of t~e
causes of his being discharged by Newman from his
employment at $100 a week which plaintiffs had ac-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

110
cepted at the beginning of the hospital job. See ante
pp. 41-46.

Even should we give full credit to this lame attempt
at the last moment to patch up a set of figures on the
witness stand footing 71,000 cubic yards (to approximate
the 72,676.05 contained in the excluded letter Exhibit F of
Col. Howarth, the army engineer) , and let it go at that.
Still plaintiffs would have no supplement or substitute for
the void Dansie report, in respect of disbursements,. and
net amount of profits subject to division with plaintiffs in
accounting. It is only net profits of a joint enterprise after
all operating expenses and liabilities are paid that can be
divided. Assuming the plaintiffs were joint adventurers
on the hospital job, as claimed, still the burden was upon
them to show, in an accounting, how much the net profits
are, and how much defendant Newman owed them. And
do it by legal evidence at that, not by hearsay.
The 72,676.05 cubic yards hauled on this job (see exhibit F, 2nd letter) the plaintiffs counsel was trying to
approximate by this witness as having been hauled before
September 3rd, 1942, were really the result of much continued hauling by Newman's trucks after that date. See
his testimony abstracted ante page 46 of this brief. His
hauling on the job did not end until January 21, 1943.
There is another fatal defect of proofs to support paragraph 6 of the findings (post p. 146) in addition to those
already pointed out. And that is, the computation of sixtynine cents per cubic yard on 72,676.05, cubic yards (instead
of Dunkley's approximately 71,000 cubic yards testified
above). The contract was originally taken by Newman for
59 cents a cubic yard (ante p. 41). Mr. Dansie in his
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skirmishes about town professed to have found that after
the contract was let on August lOth or 11th, 1942, and
that after defendant Newman had hauled 59,492 cubic yards
between that date and September 3rd, 1942, the Government
army engineers had made a "change order" raising the
price per cubic yard to be paid on this job from fifty-nine
cents to sixty-nine cents per cubic yard. With respect to
this feature the report stated (post pp. 136-7) that:
"Under date of Sept. 6, 1942, a change order
relating to this contract was initiated, and final approval was given in December, 1942, changing the
terms of the contract to 100,00 cubic yards at a
price of 69 cents. The change order in itself does
not offer any particular explanation for the change
made. Without presuming to express any opinion
as to the legal implications of the change order in
question, the undersigned has used a price of 69;
cents upon the assumption the change order relates
to the contract as a whole."
But what authority of law did Mr. Dansie have to
assume anything to the advantage of the plaintiffs and to
the detriment of the defendant in his professed attempt
to strike a just account between them? There is no direct
evidence in the record that the change order was to cover
the entire haulage of 72,676.05 cubic yards hauled to the
hospital fill area (including the 59,492: cubic yards hauled
before September 3rd, 1942). It may or may not have.
Whether it did or not, the consideration for the increased
price must, in sound reason, have been some additional
valuable service or benefit to the government, or of detriment to Newman, that would influence such an allowance
of ten cents additional per cubic yard to that which the
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Government had bound itself to pay in the first instance.
And if so, the ten cents extra would inure to Newman, not
to plaintiffs who had contributed nothing toward earning
this increase of allowance. Their work on the job had been
done on the basis of $100 per week wages; and they quit
even that employment before this increase of 10 cents a yard
was allowed or even earned by Newman. But we are not
without some direct light on the subject. There was a certain document in writing bearing on this subject of ·the
change order, and the reason for it, that was read into this
record by the trial judge himself, wherein it is stated that
the additional ten cents was allowed to Newman to compensate him for a longer haul that was required by the Government engineers to get material preferred to that which
Newman had been hauling under the contract prior to September 6, 1942, when the change order was initiated (Rec.
pp. 402-3).
And to follow this up, the defendant's attorney at the
trial made a tender and offer of proof by witnesses to go
upon the witness stand and testify to the same effect, viz:
a longer haul costing Newman more money to perform his
contract. But the offer of proof was refused and denied
by the court, and exception taken (Rec. pp. 307-400). Now, an
offer of available proof of a proposition is the full legal
equivalent of the actual proof, when refused by the court.
Proof cannot be rejected and at the same time hold that
the offerer's case is deficient for the lack of it, and a finding made contrary thereto.
Paragraph 8 of the findings is wrong for the same reasons as paragraph 7. Defendant can have no objection to
any deduction or reduction from this unjust and unlawful
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udgment. But there is no evidence to support a judgment
:or one amount or another. We know of no authority of
aw for a trial court to make a conditional finding as to any
Lmount found due and owing, or to exact an indemnity bond
:rom a defendant as a condition of not making the amount
arger or smaller. The power to exact a bond is statutory,
:ts in cases of attachment, replevin, receivership, injunction
md the like, as a condition for relief which a party may not
lemand as of right before trial on the merits. The power
does not exist without a statute. No law authorizes the court
:o exact a bond in connection with its final judgment in a
~ase like this. This provision in the finding is null and void.
rhe court should have required liquidation of the Birdzell
:tnd Harrison-Dorman claims by action at law if necessary
:>efore proceeding to distribute in any event. ~-·,._.
ttzw:iak edt .itu P 1 Us ;i~ftlh·N;;uiitci;~~-- · !Bevec;o
;-·JDnt _ altt?'S' a tu t1 .ll:e•MIIi. . .
ur~
*1 I Ue ·sea ltll'Ca !" lh
The Court should make a specific and unconditional
[inding that a definite amount is due, or that nothing at all
ls due. It cannot find in one amount if the losing party
[urnish security to the favored party, or a higher amount
!f he fail to give security.
If Huber and Dunkley are partners or joint venturers
with Newman the court should have so found and decreed
:>efore ever going into an accounting. Then such a question
:ts this would not have arisen.
The utmost complexity is introduced by the provisions
:or bond and counter-bond between the parties. Any dif:erences or contention between the parties as to the phrase>logy of the bonds would throw the whole matter into con-

iiJ•t•·•

t

-
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fusion with each party accusing the other and probabl,
unenforcibility. The whole procedure is unknown to cod
practice.
The conclusions of law, depending on the findings ar1
responsive to none of them, and do not follow as a lawfu
conclusion.
THE FINAL DECREE
The judgment for $19,451.03 is not responsive to thE
findings, and in addition is beset with the same maladie!
that afflict the findings. That is, it rests on hearsay testi·
mony, and a document called a referee's report, which call
not stand or function as such in this case.
The judgment is also void because it is unconditional
for $19,451.03, but conditional as to execution for part of
it, whereas the finding of fact is for $19,431.03 conditional
upon certain bonds being executed by each party to the
other. If plaintiffs failed to furnish their bond first for
$7000, defendant was not obligated to file his bond for
$3300. No bond has been filed by either party. Yet an
unconditional judgment for $19,451.03 was entered immediately without waiting for any bonds to be filed as
directed by the findings.
Part of the total $19,451.03 in the amount of $6,808.06
is the proportionate share of certain obligations which
plaintiffs ought to pay, if their contentions can be maintained that they were partners, and they have no right to
be secured in respect thereof by Newman, on penalty of
a judgment against him in that increased amount if he
fails to give such security.
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IN CONCLU.SION, let it be said that the preparation
of this brief has been a rush job, due to the writer's late
employment in the case, some weeks or a month or more
after the appeal was taken. It had to be completed within
scant time in order to get it printed and filed in this court
within extended time therefor, rather than trust to chances
for getting a further extension. With time, the brief might
have been condensed, a more orderly arrangement perfected,
and some additional questions dealt with for which there
is now insufficient time. For this we crave the patient
indulgence of the court.
Respectfully submitted,

0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellant Newman.
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APPENDIX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
E. J. HUBER and RALPH DUNKLEY,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED
COMPLAINT
(Rec. 13-16)

vs.
VICTOR NEWMAN,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs complain of defendant and for cause of action
allege:
1. That on or about the fore part of April, 1942, the
plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral agreement
in which they agreed to enter into the contracting business
and accept bids for certain work to be done in the intermountain area. That pursuant to said oral agreement the plaintiffs and defendant accepted contracts on certain jobs in
the intermountain area and completed the same and divided
their profits on the basis of one-third each.
2. That ever since the fore part of April, 1942, these
plaintiffs and defendant have carried on and now continue
to carry on said business and have at the present time three
uncompleted jobs which were undertaken by these plaintiffs
and this defendant jointly; these jobs being termed by the
parties as the railroad job, hospital job and Harrison-Dorman job, all in the County of Tooele, State of Utah.
3. That these plaintiffs have at all times and in all
things duly conformed to their understandings and done

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

117
their part in all respects in accordance with said understandings.
4. That there was no definite term agreed upon between the parties as to the termination of said partnership.
That it is the desire of these plaintiffs to terminate this
partnership immediately. That the said defendant has wilfully and persistently breached the understanding agreement between the parties. That he refuses to account for
moneys received on what is termed the "hospital job." That
he continually makes statements that he will not permit
these plaintiffs to participate in their share of the profits
which will be received on the hospital job. That the said
defendant is so conducting himself in matters relating to the
partnership business that it is not reasonably practical to
carry on the business in said partnership with him.
5. That the defendant has excluded the plaintiffs from
participation in the jobs herein enumerated; he further refuses to advise them the amounts he is collecting and what
he is doing with the money. That this defendant is co-mingling funds collected on the jobs herein set forth in his personal account in the First National Bank at Salt Lake City,
Utah, which is used in the disbursements of moneys on all
of the jobs of the Newman Construction Company. These
plaintiffs allege that there have been profits obtained from
these jobs which moneys the defendant has appropriated
to his own use, the exact amount of said moneys these plaintiffs allege is unknown for the reason that the defendant
refuses to account to these plaintiffs for any moneys received or to advise them of the amounts and the costs of
doing the jobs. This defendant has made statements that
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he was going to purchase a shovel out of the profits of the
hospital job in the amount of $8,000. That he has purchased
the shovel and these plaintiffs allege that moneys derived
from the hospital job have been used for the purchase of
said shovel. That said shovel is being used on other jobs of
this defendant. That these plaintiffs have advanced moneys
to pay workmen on the hospital job in the sum of $2,000.
Notwithstanding the fact that this defendant has received
in excess of $35,000 on the hospital job, he refuses to account to these plaintiffs for any moneys, but uses the same
as he sees fit without any consultation with these plaintiffs,
and refuses these plaintiffs the right to help decide how
and what way the moneys derived from the hospital job
shall be disbursed and to what creditors and in what amounts.
These plaintiffs have been deprived by the defendant of
their rights to participate in the management of the affairs
of the partnership; that the defendant has so many jobs
that he has neglected and is neglecting the jobs set forth
herein which is a substantial loss to these plaintiffs. That
the defendant is taking all moneys received from these jobs,
appropriating the same to his own use as he sees fit to disburse it and refusing to tell these plaintiffs how much he
has received and what he has done with it. The moneys of
the partnership are in grave danger of being lost, the same
being removed from the possession and custody of the partnership, being put into the personal possession of the defendant. That the shovel purchased from moneys received from
the hospital job has been moved from the premises and is
being materially injured because of its constant use day and
night on other jobs by the defendant and without

reim~urse-
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tent or accounting to these plaintiffs. That by reason of
x:cluding these plaintiffs from participating and assisting
1 the finishing of the jobs set forth herein, the funds of
he partnership will substantially be depleted.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment as follows:
1. That the partnership now existing between plain[ffs and defendant be dissolved, that an account may be
aken of each and all the said co-partnership dealings and
ransactions from the time of the commencement thereof;
md also an account of the moneys received and paid by the
>laintiffs and defendant, respectively, in regard thereto;
he plaintiffs being now ready and willing and to hereby
•ffer to account for the partnership dealings and transac:ions which have been carried on by these plaintiffs; and
hat the defendant may be decreed to pay to the plaintiffs
~hat, upon the taking of said accounts, shall appear to be
.ue them.
2. That a receiver be appointed with full power and
mthority to collect and receive all moneys and debts now
lue or to become due to the said partnership, or to the plainiffs and defendant, or either of them, as partners; to pay
ll debts of the partnership now due or to become due; to
1anage and conduct the business of the said partnership
a the future, for the joint benefit of the plaintiffs and
:efendant; and to do all other matters necessary and proper
o such conduct and management; to sell the property and
ffects of said partnership and to make a distribution of
he profits of the said partnership to the plaintiffs and
efendant according to the interest which they have therein.
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3. For cost of suit, and for such further and othE
relief as the nature of the case may require.
{Verified)
Filed Oct. 29, 1942.
L. W. CALLISTER,
Attorney for

Plaintiff~

.[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
(Rec. 51-59)
The defendant above named for his amended answe1
and amended counter-claim to plaintiffs' amended complain1
herein, says :
For his FIRST DEFENSE thereto that the amendec
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
For his SECOND DEFENSE the defendant specifically
denies that on or about the forepart of April, 1942, or at
any time, the plaintiffs and defendant entered into an ora]
agreement in which they agreed to enter into the contracting business and accept bids on certain work to be done in
the intermountain area. Denies that pursuant to said. ora1
agreement the plaintiffs and defendant accepted contracts
on certain jobs in the intermountain area and completed the
same and divided their profits on the basis of one-third
each. Denies that ever since the forepart of April, 1942,
these plaintiffs and defendant have carried on and now

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

121
carry on said business. Denies that at the present time,
or at the time the amended or original complaint herein
was filed, plaintiffs and defendant had three uncompleted
jobs which had been undertaken by these plaintiffs and defendant jointly. Admits that plaintiffs and defendant had
transactions with reference to or concerning three certain
construction jobs known and referred to as the railroad job,
hospital job, and Harrison-Dorman job all in Tooele County,
State of Utah, but denies that said jobs were taken or transactions had under or pursuant to any partnership or joint
agreement or undertaking as alleged, or otherwise than as
alleged in defendant's third defense and counter-claim herein. Defendant denies each and every allegation in the
amended complaint contained not hereinbefore specifically
admitted or denied.
For his THIRD DEFENSE and COUNTER-CLAIM
against the plaintiffs defendant alleges:
1. That this defendant is, and for a long time past,
has been engaged in the construction business, specifically
in the business of grading, hauling, moving and disposal of
large quantities of earth, gravel and rock, in preparation for
the construction and erection of important public works,
mostly incident to and required by the defense activities of
the United States Government and its several agencies,
subordinates and corporate instrumentalities and functionaries. Defendant is a large and effective operator in his said
field or branch of construction work, is possessed of large
quantities of machinery, trucks, tools and equipment which
he owns, uses and employs in said construction work, and
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employs for hire the owners of other trucks and equipment
to aid therein, and by his recognized energy, judgment and
ability in the said field of construction work has earned and
holds the confidence and esteem of the employing agencies
and instrumentalities of the United States Government, both
civil and military. So that his services have been and are
much in demand for the performance of such construction
jobs where ability, dispatch and economy of operation are
required in the public interest. As a consequence he is, and
for some time past, has been entrusted with contracts for
large construction works, each such contract separate and
apart from all others, but running in whole or in part concurrently with other contracts, and each involving the handling and disbursement of large sums of money and the assumption of heavy responsibilities, by the contra.cting parties. Said jobs required constant effective supervision, skill
and management to see that all operatives and equipment
are continually employed to the best economy and effect.
That because said jobs are usually separated and at a distance from each other, this defendant has been and is unable
to be constantly in attendance upon each of his said contract jobs, and he is obliged therefore to employ competent
persons of requisite skill, judgment and energy to supervise
and oversee work on several jobs and contracts in his interest and in his place.
2. That accordingly on or about the several dates and
times next hereinafter mentioned defendant was awarded
and entered into contracts by and with each of the. several
contracting parties to be named, and each requiring defendant to do large construction work in the grading, hauling,
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moving and disposal of large quantities of earth, gravel and
rock, and each requiring a specified rate of progress and
time for completion, under penalty of forfeiture, and defendant gave bond to each with security for performance thereof, to wit:
On or about July 25th, 1942, this defendant contracted
with the Harrison-Dorman Company, a corporate operative
under contract for larger construction work, for work to be
done at or near Wendover in Tooele County, Utah.
On or about the lOth day of August, 1942, this defendant contracted with the United States Government for
the doing of certain other construction work at or near
Wendover in Tooele, Utah.
On or about the 15th day of August, 1942, this defendant contracted in writing with the Western Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation for the doing of certain other
construction work at or near Wendover in Tooele County,
Utah.
3. That at or about the time of the commencement
of his work on said Harrison-Dorman Job, and because defendant could not by reason of his other contracts and commitments be always personally present thereon, defendant
employed the plaintiffs for a reward or compensation to
perform his duties of management and to supervise the
work, operatives and management of the operatives, personnel and equipment employed thereon, in defendant's place
and for his use and benefit; to receive and faithfully account for and disburse any moneys entrusted to them in
said employment, or deposited in bank to their credit for
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said purposes; to keep true accounts, books of record, pay
rolls and vouchers in detail. And when the additional jobs
above mentioned, known as the railroad job and the Hospital job were undertaken by defendant as aforesaid, the
employment and duties of the plaintiffs were by like agreement and for a compensation or reward, extended to and
made applicable by further agreement with defendant in
respect thereto. In addition thereto, the plaintiff Huber by
special agreement with defendant undertook for a compensation to keep said accounts, pay rolls, books and records on
each of said jobs separate and apart from the others.
4. The plaintiffs accepted said employment and entered
upon the performance thereof. In accepting said employment the plaintiffs well knew and understood the nature
and requirements thereof as aforesaid, and they agreed and
undertook to faithfully perform the same, to be loyal to
their employer and his interests, to seek no separate or selfish interest or profit therefrom save their agreed compensation as aforesaid, and to at all times make full and true disclosure of all matters affecting his interests and keep naught
secret from him in respect thereto.
5. In the course of operations under said contracts
this defendant caused his own personal checks to be issued
in payment to the various employees, operatives and personnel employed thereon. But in order to supplement the
same and to enable plaintiffs to meet and defray certain
urgencies as they arose, this defendant also. deposited in
bank to the credit of the plaintiffs in cash, large sums
of money, in the total sum of more than $13,000 upon which
they could, and did from time to time, draw checks-not
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all of which were to meet and pay urgencies or other necessities of their said employment, but also for their private
and unauthorized uses and purposes, or for unexplained disbursements for which they have made no account to defendant, but have been kept secret from him. That the plaintiffs have been fully paid for their services, or if aught remains, the same is exceeded by funds and property of defendant for which they are accountable to him, and for which
they have not accounted.
6. That the plaintiffs in the course of their said employment failed to keep true, accurate and complete books
of account and records showing all their receipts and disbursements upon said three jobs, and failed to keep the accounts and disbursements on each job separate and distinct
from the others, but combined and commingled the same so
that the same cannot be separated or distinguished, and so
that the status of defendant's operations and accounts on
each job cannot be determined, nor yet the status of accounts as between defendant and the plaintiffs upon all
or either of said jobs separately. Thereby they have prevented and made impossible any true, just or complete accounting of their transactions in said employment. Likewise, by their amended complaint herein they claim to have
commingled their own private cash funds with the funds of·
this defendant entrusted to their care, or in the bank account
in which defendant's funds were deposited for his use and
benefit. That by said wrongful acts the plaintiffs have prevented and made impossible such accounting as they pretend
to seek by their amended complaint herein.
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7. That in order to make an attempted accounting by
defendant with his employing patrons under said contracts,
defendant has been and will be required to incur and pay
large expense to employ and pay expert accountants to audit
and settle the same, and to make an attempted reconciliation
thereof, so far as possible to satisfy his said patrons and
obtain a settlement with them of work done upon said three
jobs.
8. Likewise, because the plaintiffs failed to exercise
the measure of care, prudence, energy and effective supervision over the employees, operative personnel and equipment on said jobs, to secure the requisite rate of progress
thereon with economy, the rate of progress on said jobs fell
below the requirements of said contracts, exposing defendant to deductions, penalties, and forfeitures, so that profits
were prevented or greatly diminished-the extent whereof
is confused and uncertain because of said failure and defaults in accounting hereinbefore alleged. The said Harrison-Dorman job was cancelled and withdrawn from defendant under the provisions thereof, so that defendant can
expect only a partial settlement thereunder, and either
diminished profits or direct losses thereunder.
9. That because of the misconduct and defaults of the
plaintiffs hereinbefore alleged, when the same came to defendant's knowledge, the defendant did on or about the 15th
day of September, 1942, discharge and remove the plaintiffs from their employment, and demanded that they return
to defendant all books, records, vouchers, and other documents, data and information in their possession concerning
said jobs, and an accounting of and repayment of all of
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defendant's funds entrusted to them, not properly disbursed;
but the plaintiffs have hitherto failed and refused to comply with said demand, except in small and inadequate part.
From one or more of the account books, containing inadequate and insufficient accounts, there appears to have been
removed and abstracted certain leaves before delivering the
same, thereby withholding full information and further
preventing a true accounting of matters affecting plaintiffs'
adversely.
10. Defendant denies the averments of partnership as
contained in plaintiffs' amended complaint; denies that any
accounting is due from defendant to plaintiffs: alleges on
the contrary that there is due from plaintiffs to defendant
an accounting of plaintiffs' acts and doings aforesaid, while
serving in the capacity of trust and confidence on said construction jobs; that the cost of proper and necessary audits
be charged in account against them; and that upon a final
accounting defendant have judgment against plaintiffs for
the balance found to be due him in the premises, be the
same $5,000 or more or less than said sum.
11. Alleges that the construction jobs herein mentioned
are the identical jobs and transactions sought to be complained about in the plaintiffs' complaint, but says that the
same were no partnership transactions.
WHEREFORE, defendant demands the judgment of the
court that the plaintiffs be ordered and decreed to account
to the defendant for and concerning the moneys, property
and contract interests of the defendant so committed to their
custody and control. That upon the taking and settling of
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said account, the defendant have judgment against them
for the amount found to be due, be the same more or less
than the sum of $5,000, and for his costs herein incurred.
For a FOURTH DEFENSE and COUNTE&-CLAIM defendant alleges :
He refers to, and by reference makes part hereof
paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and makes the averments thereof applicable to the contract job and transaction
next herein alleged, except that he omits allusion to the
three contract jobs in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, mentioned,
and he omits any reference to or averment of the deposit of
funds by defendant with plaintiffs or to their credit in bank,
as contained in paragraph 5 thereof.
1.

2. That on or about the 1st day of July, 1942, this defendant contracted in writing with the Jacobson-Construction Company, a corporation, for the doing of certain construction work at or near the Fort Douglas Military Reservation in Salt Lake County, Utah, requiring the grading,
moving and disposal of a large quantity of earth, gravel
and rock, and defendant gave bond with security for the
performance thereof.
3. That at or about the time when work was begun on
said Fort Douglas job, or soon thereafter, this defendant employed the plaintiffs for a compensation or reward to perform personal services in the nature of supervision and management thereof, and of the operatives, personnel and equip.
ment employed thereon. That said e·mployment was one of
trust and confidence, involving the care, custody and control
of trucks and other operating equipment of large value, the
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supervision and direction of personnel and equipment; to
;eek no selfish profit or advantage; the keeping and renderlng of faithful accounts of their operations thereunder; and
the plaintiffs held themselves out as possessing the requisite skill, judgment and ability to perform the same.
4. That during the course of performance of the construction work under said contract, and before the same was
near completion, the plaintiffs, in violation of their duty and
obligation of loyalty to defendant, of exerting themselves in
his interest alone and to seek no private profit or benefit
beyond their agreed compensation, and in violation of their
duty to keep accurate and complete accounts of their doings,
and to serve him only in their capacity of trusted agents,
managers and supervisors of the work on said job, in the
midst of their operations thereunder, the said plaintiffs represented and stated to the defendant that they had fully
performed and completed the construction work under and
required by the provisions of defendant's contract with the
said Jacobson Construction Company, with the result that
a net profit was earned in the sum of to wit: $5,400. But
defendant alleges that the work on said job had not been
completed but the same remained largely incomplete at said
time, as the plaintiffs well knew or could and should have
known by reference to the said contract and the specifications thereof.
5. That defendant was then busily occupied and engrossed with his work upon other large and important contracts and construction jobs requiring his entire time and
attention. He believed the said statements and representations of the plaintiffs to be true, reposing trust and confi-
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dence in their honesty, integrity and business capacity. S<
believing, and intending to compensate them liberally f01
faithful service well done and profitable to himself, the de.
fendant thereupon paid to each of the plaintiffs the sum of
$1,000 as full payment and extra emolument to them therefor, in the form of a division of the profits believed to have
been earned by them for him.
6. That thereafter it was ascertained and determined
by engineers employed by the military authorities of the
United States, for whose use and benefit said work was
ordered by said Jacobson Construction Company, that work
under said contract was and remained largely incomplete.
Thereupon claim and demand was made upon defendant by
said corporation for completion of said unfinished job, and
the same was thereafter completed by or on behalf of this
defendant, and at his cost and expense. The cost of such
completion consumed the entire contract price and more, resulting in a loss to defendant in excess. thereof, and producing a loss of more than the $2,000 paid to the plaintiffs. By
due and reasonable care, diligence, skill and ability the said
job could have been completed at a profit.
7. That the plaintiffs are men of uncertain finances
and an action at law would be no adequate remedy. That
the items of receipts and disbursements to be taken into account are numerous and complicated; that the reckoning involves matters to be taken into account in equity in matters
of breach of the relation of trust and confidence, and requires also a measure of discovery from the plaintiffs in
the matter of their books and records.; that in addition a
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;eparate computation thereof would involve a multiplicity
)f actions, whereas the same may be conveniently taken into
account in the same proceeding with the accounting required
under the third defense and counter-claim hereof, and at
less cost and expense than in a separate accounting.
8.

As a further ground therefor, defendant alleges

that the said Fort Douglas job herein mentioned, is within
the time and scope of the alleged partnership contract alleged by plaintiff in their amended complaint herein as commencing to operate from the forepart of April, 1942.
WHEREFORE, defendant demands judgment against
the plaintiffs that they account to defendant for and concerning their transactions under said Fort Douglas job, and
and that the same be included in any accounting to be ordered or decreed as prayed for in the third defense and
counter-claim hereunder; that a general balance be struck
and that defendant recover judgment against plaintiffs for
the amount so to be found due him, and for costs of this
action.
(Verified)
(Filed Feb. 2, 1943)

0. H. MATTHEWS,
Attorney for Defendant.
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EXHIBIT E
(Rec. 448-478)

CASE NO. 69166
NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY
REPORT ON ACCOUNTING
Stearns-Rogers Job
Fort Douglas Job
Harrison-Dorman Job
GeerJob
Railroad Job
Hospital Job
Filed in the Clerk's Office,
Salt Lake County, Utah,
June 3, 1943.
Alvin Keddington, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court
By Robert A. Olsen,
Deputy Clerk.
Filed August 27, 1943.
Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah.
THE GODDARD-ABBEY CO.
Certified Public Accountants
Mcintyre Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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May 28, 1943
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich,
Judge Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to an order of the court dated April
24, 1943, in the matter entitled E. J. Huber and
Ralph Dunkley vs. Victor Newman, the undersigned
has made an examination of existing books, documents and papers submitted by the parties to this
suit, and has made considerable independent investigation to establish facts not shown by such records.
A report is now presented consisting of the exhibits
and schedules listed 'below, together with comments
relating thereto.
EXHIBITS:
"A" Summary of Income and Expenses by
Jobs.
"B" Statement of the Account of Victor Newman.
"C" Statement of the Account of Huber and
Dunkley.
SCHEDULES:
"1"
"2"
"3"
"4"
"5"

Stearns-Rogers Job-Revenue.
Stearns-Rogers Job-Job Costs.
Fort Douglas Job-Revenues.
Fort Douglas Job-Disbursements.
Fort Douglas J o'b-Equipment Rentals
Payable.
"6" Fort Douglas Job-Pay Roll Taxes.
"7" Wendover Jobs-Revenues.
"8" Wendover Jobs-Disbursements.
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"9" Wendover Jobs-Equipment Rentals Dw
to Victor Lawrence as at September 3
1942.
"10" Wendover Jobs-Equipment Rentals Dw
to Victor Newman as at September 3
1942.
"11" Wendover Jobs-Equipment Rentals DuE
to Ed Huber as at September 3, 1942.
"12" Wen dover Jobs-Equipment Rentals Due
to Ralph Dunkley as at September 3,
1942.
"13" Wendover Jobs-Bills Due on Wendover
Jobs as at September 3, 1942 subsequently
paid by Victor Newman.
"14" Wendover Jobs-Pay Roll Taxes Payable
by Victor Newman.
"15" Wendover Jobs-Pay Roll Taxes Payable
by Huber and Dunkley and Account Payable by Huber and Dunkley.
"16" Wendover Jobs-Costs on Railroad Job
at Salduro during November, 1942.
"17" Funds transferred to Huber and Dunkley
by Victor Newman.
COMMENTS
Exhibit "A" has been constructed to show the
amount of net profits resulting from the various jobs
covered by this report. The detailed items entering
into the revenues and expenses of the various jobs
are shown in the schedules numbered "1" to "17" referred to in Exhibit "A."
Exhibit "B" is a statement of the account- of
Victor Newman in which he is given credit for onethird of the profits accruing from the jobs, together
with credits for equipment rentals earned by his own
equipment while working on the jobs in question, and
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credits for expenditures paid or payable by him on
account of these jobs for which he should be reimbursed from revenues received from the job. The
account has been charged with all revenues accruing from the jobs in question which have been paid
to Newman. The excess of charges to Newman's
account over the credits to which he is entitled represents an amount for which Newman is accountable
to Huber and Dunkley.
Exhibit "C" is a statement of the account of
Huber and Dunkley in which they are given credit
for two-thirds of the profits from the jobs in question
together with credits for equipment rentals due them
and credits for expenditures made by them. Their
account is charged with revenues accruing from the
jobs which were paid to them, and they are also
charged with funds transferred to them by Newman.
The resulting excess of credits over charges in their
a.ccount is the reciprocal to the balance in Newman's
account and represents the amount due from Newman.
While it is recognized there may be expenditures
related to the jobs in question which are not reflected
in this report, such omission if it exists, is due to a
lack of any record or evidence of such expenditure
coming to the attention of the referee in this matter.
There are two or three special circumstances
which the referee feels should be covered by brief
comment in this report in order to clarify the position taken.
There are certain revenues which have been included in Schedule "3" which it may be argued should
not be included in this report. The items in question
are the amounts of $147.00 for extra work and $466.00
received from J. H. Haslem. The reason these amounts
have been included, is the fact that the costs incurred
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in connection with these two revenues are includet
in the costs of the Fort Douglas Job on Newman':
books and cannot be segregated.
Due to the fact that costs related to the job1
at Wendover do not lend themselves to easy segrega
gation those jobs have been treated as a unit in thil
report. The final result is not affected in any wal
by this method of handling and it was felt that thE
considerable additional time that would be required
to make a segregation would cause unwarranted ad·
ditional expense.
The revenue from the hospital job, as shown in
schedule "7" has been bas.ed upon the number of
cubic yards reported to be in place as at the close of
business September 3, 1942. The report was received
from Lt. Col. G. A. Howarth, area engineer for the
U. S. Government at Wend over, upon request by the
undersigned made through Mr. Newman. In another
letter from Gol. How.arth advice is given that the
total yardage of the hospital job, exclusive of miscellaneous work done under that contract number, is
72,676.05 cubic yards. The hospital job proper is
reported as officially completed under date of September 30, 1942. Request has been made of Mr. Newman's office to furnish information from the U.S.
area engineer, and from their own records, giving
details as to the placement of the yardage. represented
by the difference between 59,492 yards and 72,676.05
yards. Up to the date of the preparation of this report the additional information has not been received.
There is a difference of opinion between the
parties involved in this case as to the price per cubic
yard at which the revenue from the hospital job
should b~ computed. The original contract called for
100,000 cubic yards of fill at a price of 59 cents per
yard. Under date of September 6, 1942, a change
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order relating to this contract was initiated, and final
approval was given in December, 1942, changing the
terms of the contract to 100,000 cubic yards at a
price of 69 cents. The change order in itself does not
offer any particular explanation for the change made.
\Vithout presuming to express any opinion as to the
legal implications of the change order in question, the
undersigned has used a price of 69 cents upon the
assumption the change order relates to the contract
as a whole.
R. lVL Birdzell of Wen dover, Utah, has made a
claim that there is a balance of $2,632.45 owing him
for sand and gravel, and fill dirt in connection with
the Harrison and Dorman job. Investigation concerning this claim has developed the fact that a controversy exists v1ith respect to whether or not this
amount is owing by Newman, Huber and Dunkley.
Due to the fact the amount has never been paid and
there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not
it is due no effect has been given to same in this report. If it develops that such amount, or any portion
of it, is owing then it should be charged one-third
to Newman and two-thirds to Huber and Dunkley
to maintain the proper relationships of the parties
as set forth in this report.
The final matter relates to information given by
Mr. Bradshaw Harrison of the firm of Harrison and
Dorman. Mr. Harrison stated to the undersigned
that under date of April 28, 1943, his firm had made
a demand upon Victor Newman for payment of the
sum of $7,579.64 in connection with their contract
with Newman. It was explained that this amount
represented a settlement with Curtis Sand and Gravel
Company of the excess cost in having Curtis complete Newman's contract with them. No effect has
been given to this item in this report and if this
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amount, or any part of it, is determined to be due
Harrison and Dorman it should be charged one-third
to Newman and two-thirds to Huber and Dunkley.
Respectfully submitted,
Wallace W. Dansie,
Certified Public Accountant.
Here follows some twenty-five pages of tabulated figures arranged in columns, headings, totals, etc. We do not deem
it necessary or material to print these tables for the reason that our objections do not run to the additions or
computations, but to the sources from which the information was obtained, the privacy of the investigations by
which it was obtained, and the referee's failure to conduct a public judicial trial as a basis for its compilation.
THE AUTHORS

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rec. 83-90)
This cause coming on regularly to be heard before the
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, one of the Judges of the above
entitled court, sitting without a jury, at the courtroom of
said court, in the City and County Building at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on the 4th day of June, 1943, the plaintiffs,
E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley, appearing in person and
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with their attorney, Louis H. Callister, and the defendant,
Victor Newman, appearing in person and with his attorneys,
0. H. Matthews and E. M. Morrissey, and evidence being
submitted by the plaintiffs and defendant, and it further
appearing that the court was fully advised in the premises,
now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, to wit:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That on or about the fore part of April, 1942, the
plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral agreement in
which they agreed to enter into contracting business to
accept bids and do work on certain jobs in the intermountain
area; it was further orally agreed between the parties hereto, E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley and Victor Newman, that
on any of the jobs where the plaintiffs or the defendant
furnished equipment or machinery that they would receive
a reasonable rental therefor, and the same to be deducted
as expenses, the same as any other machinery or equipment
rented from outside parties; said oral agreement further
provided that any profits from any job were to be paid to
the plaintiffs and defendant one-third each, that is on~third
to each of the plaintiffs and one-third to the defendant; that
pursuant to said oral agreement plaintiffs and defendant
made bids on jobs, and particularly on jobs herein set forth,
sometimes in the names of the plaintiff and sometimes in
the name of the defendant; that the said plaintiffs and the
defendant did various jobs under the terms and conditions
of this agreement from the fore part of April, 1942, to and
including the 3rd day of September, 1942; that on the jobs
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in which an accounting was had the profits derived therefrom in accordance with said agreement were divided onethird to each party, that is, one-third each to each of the
plaintiffs and one-third to the defendant. However, there
was not a complete accounting on what is termed the Stearns
Rogers Job, Harrison-Dorman Job, Geer Job, Fort Douglas
Job, Railroad Job and Hospital Job; that the plaintiffs and
defendant accepted and did work as a joint venture on the
aforementioned jobs under the terms and conditions of said
oral agreement herein above set forth ; this court finds that
the plaintiffs. and defendant entered into s.aid jobs on a joint
venture and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to a complete accounting as to all moneys. received and disbursed by
the said defendant and the plaintiffs in the aforementioned
jobs. That the court, in order to ascertain all of the facts
in this case, appointed a referee, that is, Wallace Dansie, to
make a report of this court as to an accounting as to the
amounts due and owing from this defendant to these plaintiffs.
2. That the referee has. heretofore rendered to this
court his report and accounting, of which this court has
adopted in part and modified in part; that this court finds
that the plaintiffs and defendants entered into the aforementioned jobs on a joint venture, and in respect to the hospital job that there was a joint venture as of to and including the 3rd day of September, 1942.

3. That these plaintiffs. have at all times and in all
things duly conformed to their understandings and done
their part in all respects. in accordance with said understandings.
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4. That there was no definite term agreed upon between the parties as to the term of said joint venture; that
the defendant, Victor Newman, refused to account for
moneys received and expended in respect to the jobs hereinabove set forth in paragraph one.
5. That the court heretofore appointed Wallace Dansie
as the referee to render an accounting before this court as
to the amount due and owing between the plaintiffs, E. J.
Huber and Ralph Dunkley, and the defendant, Victor Newman; that the referee found, and the court hereby adopts
the report in which he found, the following due and owing
in respect to income and disbursements between the parties
hereto:
Exhibit "A"

NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY
SUMMARY OF INCOME AND EXPENSES BY JOBS
STEARNS-ROGERS JOB:
Total Revenue-per Schedule No. 1 ..... $550.20
Total Expenses-per Schedule No. 2 .... 436.98
Net profit from Job ............... .

$113.22

FORT DOUGLAS JOB-JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION CO.:
Total Revenue-per Schedule No.3. $12,110.85
Expenses:
Disbursements per
Schedule No. 4 .... $7,197.76
Equipment Rentals,
Schedule No. 5. . . . 1,144.13
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Pay Roll Taxes,
Schedule No.6....

89.20

Total expenses . . . . . . . . . . .

8,431.09

Net profit from job . . . . . . . . . . .

$ 3,679.76

WENDOVER JOBS-HARRISON AND DORMAN JOB
GEER JOB
RAILROAD JOB
HOSPITAL JOB
Revenue:
Harrison and Dorman Job, per
schedule "7" ................ $15,997.00
Geer Job, per schedule "7" . . . . . 1,192.00
Railroad Job, per schedule "7" . . 2,900.00
Hospital Job, per schedule "7" .. 41,049.48
Total

$61,138.48

Expenses:
Disbursements, per schedule, "8":
R. Dunkley Account ........... $ 1,653.56
Huber and Dunkley Account . . . 12,674.31
Victor Newman Account . . . . . . 17,420.52
865.14
Ed. Huber Account . . . . . . . . . . .
Accounts Payable:
Equipment Rentals:
Due Victor Lawrence, per
schedule "9" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Due Victor Newman, per
schedule "10" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4,718.90
5,780.23
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Due Ed. Huber, per
schedule "11" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Due Ralph Dunkley, per
schedule "12" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miscellaneous Bills, per
schedule "13" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pay Roll Taxes, per
schedule "14" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pay Roll Taxes, per
schedule "15" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Due State Line Service, per
schedule "15" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Costs on Railroad Job incurred
during November, per schedule
"16" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

695.47
600.51
1,240.34
224.80
448.25
195.47

1,150.10

Total Expenses . . . . . . . . . .

47,667.60

Net Profit from Wendover Jobs.

$13,470.88
Exhibit "B"

NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT OF VICTOR NEWMAN
CREDITS TO ACCOUNT:

:Ya of profit on Stearns-Rogers Job-Exhibit
"A" ................................. $

37.74

:Ya of profit on Fort Douglas Job-Exhibit
"A" ................................ .

:Ya of profit on Wendover Jobs-Exhibit "A".
Truck rental due on Stearns-Rogers JobSee schedule "2" ..................... .
Disbursements on Stearns-Rogers Job-See schedule "2" ..................... .
Pay Roll Taxes on Stearns-Rogers JobSchedule "2" ......................... .

1,226.59
4,490.29
6.00
369.25
15.48
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Disbursements on Fort Douglas JobSchedule "4" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,197.76
Payments to Huber and Dunkley-Schedule
"4" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000.00
Equipment rentals due on Fort Douglas Job
-Schedule "5" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947.25
Pay Roll Taxes on Fort Douglas JobSchedule "5" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
89.20
Disbursements on Wendover Jobs-Schedule
"8" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,420.52
Equipment Rentals due Victor Lawrence on
Wen dover J obs~Schedule "9" . . . . . . . . . . 4, 718.90
Equipment Rentals due Victor Newman on
Wendover Jobs-See schedule "10" . . . . . . 5,780.23
Bills Payable on Wend over Jobs subsequently
paid by Newman-See schedule "13" . . . . . . . 1,240.34
Pay Roll Taxes on Wendover Jobs payable by
Newman-See schedule "14" . . . . . . . . . . .
224.80
Costs on Railroad Job in Nov. due Newman
-Schedule "16" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,150.10
Funds transferred to Huber and Dunkley for
Wendover Jobs-Schedule "17" ......... 11,756.51
Total credits ...................... $58,670.96

CHARGES TO ACCOUNT:
Receipts from Fort Douglas Job-Jacobsen
Construction Company ................. $12,110.85
Receipts from Harrison and Dorman ....... 15,997.00
Receipts from Railroad Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,900.00
Revenue from Hospital Job-59,492 cu. yds.
@ 69c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,049.48
Total charges ..................... $72,057.33
Amount Due to Huber and Dunkley-Excess
of Charges over Credits ................ $13,386.37
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Exhibit "C"

NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT OF HUBER AND DUNKLEY
CREDITS TO ACCOUNTS:
2;3 of profit on Stearns-Rogers Job-Exhibit
"A" ................................. $
75.48
2;3 of profit on Fort Douglas Job-Exhibit
"A" ................................ . 2,453.17
2j3 of profit on Wendover Jobs-Exhibit "A".
8,980.59
Truck rentals due Ralph Dunkley on StearnsRogers Job-Schedule "2" ............. .
46.25
Truck rentals due Ed. Huber on Fort Douglas
Job-Schedule "5" .................... .
46.25
Truck rentals due Ralph Dunkley on Fort
Douglas Job-Schedule "5" ............ .
150.63
Disbursements on Wendover Jobs-Schedule

"8":
Ralph Dunkley Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,653.56
Huber and Dunkley Account . . . . . . . . . . 12,67 4.31
865.14
Ed. Huber Account ................. .
Truck rentals due Ed. Huber on Wendover
695.47
Jobs-Schedule "11" .................. .
Truck rentals due Ralph Dunkley on
600.51
Wendover Jobs-Schedule "12" ........ .
Pay Roll Taxes on Wendover Jobs payable
448.25
by Huber and Dunkley-Schedule "15" ...
Account with State Line Service paid by
195.47
Huber and Dunkley-Schedule "15" ..... .
Total credits ...................... $28,885.08
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CHARGES TO ACCOUNTS:
Receipts from Stearns-Rogers JobSchedule "1" .......................... $ 550.20
Payment by Newman to Huber-Schedule
"17" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000.00
Payment by Newman to Dunkley--Schedule
"17" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000.00
Receipts from Geer Job-Schedule "7" . . . . . 1,192.00
Funds Transferred to Huber and Dunkley by
Newman-Schedule "17" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,756.51
Total charges . ~ ................... $15,498.71
Amount Due from Victor Newman-Excess
of Credits over Charges ................ $13,386.37
6. The court further finds that there was delivered on
the Wendover Hospital Fill Job 72,676.05 cubic yards. of
dirt in accordance with the contract between Victor Newman for and on behalf of the parties1 hereto and the United
States Government (War Department) ; that there should
be added to the amount due and owing as found by the referee of $13,386.37, the sum of two-thirds of the difference
between 59,492 yards and 72,676.05 yards at a rate of sixty
nine cents per cubic yard, that is, $6,064.66, making a total
of $19,451.03; the court finds that the sum of $19,451.03 is
the amount due and owing from this defendant, Victor Newman, to these plaintiffs, E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley, as
a result of the joint venture on the following jobs: StearnsRogers Job, Fort Douglas Job, Harrison-Dorman Job, Geer
Job, Railroad Job, and Hospital Job.
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7. The court further finds that there has been presented to the defendant, Victor Newman, claims by certain
contractors, that is, Harrison-Dorman and R. M. Birdzell, in
the sums of $7,579.64 and $2,632.45 respectively, making a
total of $10,212.09; the court further finds that the plaintiffs and each of them are entitled to a judgment of this
court in the sum of $19,451.03. That in view of the alleged
claims of the Harrison-Dorman and R. M. Birdzell, this court
finds that these plaintiffs shall have judgment in the sum
of $12,642.97, being the difference between their proportionate share of the alleged claims, that is, $10,212.09, which
is $6,808.06, and the amount due as found by this court, that
is, $19,451.03. Upon presentation to this court of an indemnity bond indemnifying the said defendant, Victor Newman, against all claims, damages, costs and expenses that
may arise, and any re-negotiations with respect to the jobs
herein set forth, as a result of the non-payment of said
claims and defense of said claims not to exceed the sum of
$7,000.00, which bond must be approved by this court, then
the plaintiffs, E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley, shall be entitled to an additional judgment in the sum of $6,808.06, in
addition to the judgment which this court shall render this
day in the sum of $12,642.97; that said indemnity bond shall
provide among other things that the parties, that is, E. J.
Huber and Ralph Dunkley, shall have the right and option
to participate in the defense of said alleged claims, and participate in any re-negotiations.
8. That this court requires said indemnity bond upon
the condition that the said Victor Newman shall also present
to this court for approval his indemnity bond indemnifying
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the plaintiffs. and each of them, that is, E. H. Huber and
Ralph Dunkley, in a sum not to exceed one-third of the
amount of said claims, that is, $3,300.00, which bond shall
indemnify the plaintiffs in the same manner in which the
court finds the plaintiffs should indemnify the defendant,
Victor Newman, as hereinabove set forth ; that upon refusal
of the said Victor Newman, to present such a bond within
five days after an indemnity bond has been approved by this
court of the plaintiffs. in this action, or such other time as
the court may deem just and proper in the premises, then
and in that event, these plaintiffs shall be absolved from
any require.ment of the indemnity bond, and the plaintiffs'
bond shall be delivered back to the plaintiffs and they shall
have the right and opportunity to execute upon this judgment, that is, the whole thereof, the sum of $19,451.03.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court concludes as a matter of law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the plaintiffs. and defendant entered into the
construction jobs as hereinabove set forth on the basis of
a joint venture, and are accountable to each other as to
profits and losses on the basis of one-third each, that is, onethird to each of the plaintiffs. and one-third to the defendant.
2. That there is due and owing from this defendant,
Victor Newman, to these plaintiffs, the sum of $19,451.03,
as a result of said joint venture, and based upon an accounting of moneys received and expended by the parties hereto.
3. That the plaintiffs, before they may execute upon
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a portion of this judgment, that is, the difference between
$12,642.97 and $19,451.03, shall have approved by this court
an indemnity bond indemnifying the defendant against loss
or expenses justifiably and reasonably incurred as a result
of any damages, moneys expended or costs incurred by Harrison-Dorman and R. lVL Birdzell as hereinabove set forth
in said Findings of Fact not to exceed the sum of $7,000.00;
upon the express condition that the defendant shall within
five days, or a reasonable time as set by this court, also
have a bond approved by this court indemnifying these
plaintiffs in the same manner as these plaintiffs shall indemnify the defendant, in a sum not to exceed $3,300.00.
4. That these plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment in
the sum of $19,451.03, as due and owing from this defendant, Victor Newman, and that the plaintiffs are entitled
to execute upon this judgment in the sum of $12,642.97,
forthwith.
Done in open court this 7th day of June, 1943, 1:58 P.M.
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
Judge.
Attest: ALVIN KEDDINGTON, Clerk.
By: ROBERT A. OLSEN, Deputy Clerk.
(SEAL)
Received a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this 5th day of June, 1943, at the hour of
10:15 o'clock A.M.
0. H. MATTHEWS, E. S.,
0. H. MATTHEWS,
Attorney for the Defendant.
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Received a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Con
elusions of Law this 5th day of June, 1943, at the hour 01
11 :10 o'clock A. M.
EDW. M. MORRISSEY,
E. M. MORRISSEY,
Attorney for the Defendant
Per E. LYNCH.
ENDORSED NUMBER 69166. FILED IN THE CLERK'S
OFFICE, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, JUNE 7, 1943.
ALVIN KEDDINGTON, CLERK 3RD DISTRICT COURT,
BY ROBERT A. OLSEN, DEPUTY CLERK.

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

(Rec. 91-92)

JUDGMENT
This cause coming on regularly to be heard before the
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, one of the Judges of the above
entitled court, sitting without a jury, at the courtroom of
said court, in the City and County Building at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on the 4th day of June, 1943, the plaintiffs., E. J.
Huber and Ralph Dunkley, appearing in person and with
their attorney, Louis H. Callister, and the defendant, Victor
Newman, appearing in person and with his attorneys, 0. H.
Matthews and E. M. Morrissey, and evidence being sub·
mitted by the plaintiffs and defendant, and it further appearing that the court was fully advised in the premises, and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions. having been entered herein.
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NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That there is due and owing from the defendant,
Victor Newman, to these plaintiffs, that is, E. J. Huber and
Ralph Dunkley, the sum of $19,451.03.
2. That the plaintiffs shall not have execution upon
this judgment for the sum of $6,808.06 until such time as
they shall submit to this court an indemnity bond indemnifying the defendant against payment of certain claims known
as the Harrison-Dorman and R. M. Birdzell, and re-negotiations of contracts, said indemnity bond to be approved by
this court, not to exceed $7,000.00; upon condition, however, that defendant give to these plaintiffs the same type
of indemnity bond within five days, or such time as the
court may deem just and proper in the premises. Upon aPproval of said bonds the plaintiffs shall have execution for
the difference between the said $12,642.97 and $19,451.03,
that is $6,808.06, or upon the refusal of the defendant to
post a bond as herein provided.
Done in open court this 7th day of June, 1943. 1:58 P.M.

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
Judge.
Filed June 7, 1943.
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